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NOTE

VACATUR PENDING EN BANC REVIEW
Ruby Emberling*
When a case becomes moot on appeal, as when the parties settle, two primary
Supreme Court cases guide the appellate court’s decision about whether to vacate the lower-court opinion. The Court has said that vacatur, an equitable
remedy, promotes fairness to parties who were not responsible for the mootness
because it erases adverse legal outcomes the litigants were prevented from appealing. Beyond this, vacatur is inadvisable since it eliminates precedential decisions and harms the judiciary’s efficiency and legitimacy. Yet this doctrinal
order has not been uniformly brought to bear on the highly similar question of
whether to vacate when a case becomes moot pending en banc review. Instead,
courts have varied in their approach. Some adhere to the two primary cases,
others distinguish them by referring to the unique characteristics of en banc
review, and many simply vacate without justification. This Note calls attention to a little-discussed set of procedural doctrines and rules that carry the
power to decimate important pieces of decisional law without justification. It
offers an account of how existing doctrine fits in the en banc context, highlighting the pitfalls for judicial efficiency and legitimacy of failing to acknowledge
that fit. Ultimately, it proposes revising the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure to clarify judicial confusion on this point.
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INTRODUCTION
In Gary B. v. Whitmer, a Sixth Circuit panel ruled that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause guaranteed a right to access to literacy.1
This was hailed as “groundbreaking” precedent for education rights.2 However, an obscure set of procedural rules concerning vacatur diminished Gary
B.’s revolutionary effect.
The plaintiffs in Gary B. were students who attended some of Detroit’s
lowest-performing public schools, which “serve almost exclusively low-income children of color.”3 The students sued Michigan’s governor over shocking school conditions entirely unconducive to learning, including “missing or
unqualified teachers, physically dangerous facilities, and inadequate books
and materials.”4 Though the Supreme Court had rejected the existence of a
“broad, general right to education” protected by the Constitution, it left open
whether a minimally adequate education was protected.5 The Sixth Circuit

1. 957 F.3d 616, 648 (6th Cir.), vacated en banc, 958 F.3d 1216 (6th Cir. 2020).
2. Mark Walsh, Full Federal Appeals Court Urged to Reconsider Panel’s Right-to-Literacy
Ruling, EDUC. WEEK (May 8, 2020), https://www.edweek.org/education/full-federal-appealscourt-urged-to-reconsider-panels-right-to-literacy-ruling/2020/05 [perma.cc/NQU2-BKC6].
3. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 620–21 (quoting Complaint at 1, Gary B. v. Snyder, 329 F. Supp.
3d 344 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (No. 16-cv-13292)).
4. Id. at 620. Without a right to access to literacy, these conditions are not subject to any
viable legal challenge, leaving students in poorly funded public schools without legal recourse.
See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35–37 (1973) (holding that no constitutional cause of action exists for inadequate school funding).
5. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 644.
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panel held that it was.6 Although it was a welcome outcome for many, critics
of the opinion argued that it departed from long-standing limitations on substantive due process doctrine7 and wrongly imposed federal control onto a
traditionally state-run activity.8 Commentators predicted that the decision
was on its way to reversal in light of this opposition.9 But before any further
judicial action took place, the parties settled.10 In exchange for a release of liability for all defendants, the plaintiffs secured $3 million in emergency funds
for the Detroit Public Schools and Governor Whitmer’s promise to propose
further legislation on the topic. Additionally, Governor Whitmer pledged to
consider recommendations made by a task force on improving literacy programming in the district.11
The full Sixth Circuit then decided to take the case up en banc, likely in
order to address the hotly contested legal issues in the case.12 But the order
came six days after the court was notified of the settlement,13 an event that the
court later found had mooted the proceedings, rendering a decision on the
merits impermissible.14 Thus, the en banc court dismissed the case.15

6. Id. at 655.
7. See id. at 663–65 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (arguing that substantive due process rights
are negative rights, i.e., rights from, not rights to). But see id. at 656–57 (majority opinion) (arguing that cases recognizing a right to marriage exemplify that substantive due process rights
can be affirmative).
8. See Allison R. Donahue, A Landmark Literacy Suit Was Settled. But Republicans Won a
2nd Look in Court., MICH. ADVANCE (May 21, 2020, 5:09 AM), https://www.michiganadvance.com
/blog/a-landmark-literacy-suit-was-settled-but-republicans-won-a-2nd-look-in-court
[perma.cc/MR9H-2VYZ] (reporting the Republican-led Michigan legislature’s motion to intervene in the case).
9. A.C. v. Raimondo, 494 F. Supp. 3d 170, 193 (D.R.I. 2020) (“[I]ts fate, most likely, if it
had been heard en banc or eventually by the Supreme Court, was to be overturned . . . .”), appeal
docketed sub nom. A.C. v. McKee, No. 20-2082 (1st Cir. argued Nov. 1, 2021).
10. Appellants’ Motion to Dismiss the Case as Moot at 6, Gary B., 957 F.3d 616 (No. 181855).
11. Id. at 10–12.
12. See Gary B. v. Whitmer, 958 F.3d 1216 (6th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (ordering en banc
rehearing on May 19, 2020). En banc review entails all active judges on a circuit hearing a case
and deciding it together, except in the Ninth Circuit, where only eleven judges sit en banc at a
time. Compare, e.g., 6TH CIR. I.O.P. 35(c), with 9TH CIR. R. 35-3.
13. Letter to the Court at 1, Gary B., 957 F.3d 616 (No. 18-1855) (communicating a finalized settlement to the court on May 13, 2020). A question presented by the timeline of events in
Gary B. is at what point a settlement is final for purposes of mootness; another is whether the
court must be notified for this to be the case. For contrasting holdings on these questions, compare Versata Software, Inc. v. Callidus Software, Inc., 780 F.3d 1134 (Fed. Cir. 2015), with In re
Link_A_Media Devices Corp., 449 F. App’x 946 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
14. Gary B. v. Whitmer, No. 18-1855, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 18312, at *10 (6th Cir. June
10, 2020). When a case becomes moot, courts cannot hand down a ruling on the case’s merits.
See Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013); see also infra Section I.A. But a court may issue
orders necessary for disposing of the moot case. U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship,
513 U.S. 18, 21–22 (1994).
15. Gary B., 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 18312, at *10.
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The post-mootness dismissal of Gary B. was an unremarkable bit of judicial housekeeping. But in taking the case en banc, the court applied a local
circuit rule that automatically vacated the panel’s ruling,16 nullifying its binding precedential effect and producing a result in tension with well-established
law regarding vacatur.17 In other words, the outcome went beyond judicial
housekeeping. Although those who would have reversed the panel opinion on
the legal merits were stymied by mootness, they nonetheless achieved their
desired result by procedural means. This Note takes issue with procedural maneuvering of this sort, both because it is doctrinally suspect and because the
appearance of politically motivated judicial action that it creates is potentially
delegitimizing.
Like dismissal, vacatur is not a merits decision, so as a jurisdictional matter it remains available even after a case has become moot. But unlike dismissal, vacatur is an equitable remedy, warranted only by the need to set right
some injustice.18 The Supreme Court has distinguished “happenstance” mootness—where the parties are not responsible for the mootness—from other
types of mootness. Under United States v. Munsingwear, if “happenstance”
mootness arises while a case is on appeal, the higher court must vacate the
previous ruling. 19 The purpose of this rule is to ensure that the losing party
does not suffer adverse legal consequences it was unable to challenge on appeal.20 But when a settlement or some other event within the losing party’s
control moots a case, U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership
generally prohibits vacatur because a party that voluntarily forfeits appeal suffers no injustice.21
The Munsingwear and Bonner Mall vacatur rules are well established, but
uncertain and relatively unexamined in at least one respect: their applicability
to cases that become moot pending en banc review, as opposed to appellate
review.22 This confusion was on full display in Gary B. The en banc court neither acknowledged its automatic vacatur of the panel in its later order dismissing the case as moot nor restored the panel’s opinion.23 Instead, the court
either tacitly or unwittingly allowed the circuit’s local rule to do the work of
vacatur without addressing Bonner Mall’s effect on the outcome. In the few
post–Bonner Mall cases directly addressing vacatur of cases mooted pending

16. Gary B., 958 F.3d at 1216; 6TH CIR. R. 35(b) (“A decision to grant rehearing en banc
vacates the previous opinion and judgment of the court . . . .”).
17. Vacatur may be cited to as persuasive precedent, but according to black letter law,
vacatur otherwise eliminates precedential value. Jill E. Fisch, The Vanishing Precedent: Eduardo
Meets Vacatur, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 325, 330 (1994).
18. Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. at 26.
19. 340 U.S. 36, 39–40 (1950).
20. See id.
21. 513 U.S. at 25–26, 29.
22. See infra Section I.D.
23. Gary B. v. Whitmer, No. 18-1855, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 18312, at *10 (6th Cir. June
10, 2020).
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en banc review, including Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Veneman and Washington v. Trump, the courts appear divided and unsure. The Ninth Circuit vacated a panel ruling in Veneman when non-happenstance mootness arose
before en banc review was complete.24 However, the same circuit declined to
vacate in Washington v. Trump when non-happenstance mootness arose after
panel disposition but before en banc review was ordered.25 Both decisions
drew vehement dissents.26
Two immediate questions come to mind after a review of these cases.
First, how should the courts resolve the dispute about whether and how Bonner Mall applies to the en banc process? Second, is there any way for courts to
answer that question when cases like Gary B. are disposed of through an automatic-vacatur procedure unaccompanied by any reasoning? In sum, both
an unsettled legal principle and a procedural flaw perpetuate uncertainty by
allowing courts to evade the Bonner Mall question in en banc review.27
The self-reinforcing nature of these problems may be illuminated through
analogy. To borrow Chief Justice Roberts’s famous confirmation hearing line,
one can imagine the courts as umpires.28 It is one problem if different umpires
disagree about the size of the strike zone. Presumably, players can find out
what kind of strike zone a particular umpire adheres to and adjust their strategy accordingly. Umpires themselves may decide upon a preferred strike zone
based on observing the practices of other umpires, a process that would tend
to produce consensus on the correct strike zone. It would be an entirely different problem if, in addition, Major League Baseball allowed umpires to call
strikeouts without having called each pitch a ball or strike in the first place.
Batters, unsure about the umpire’s strike zone, would not know when to take
a chance on a high or low pitch. And crucially, umpires would not be able to
assess how their practices stack up, entrenching the inconsistency among them.
The analogy also demonstrates the serious problem automatic vacatur
poses for judicial legitimacy. Without calls on each pitch, umpires’ decisions
would be inscrutable, unpredictable, and possibly corrupt, because it is impossible to place faith in referees who offer no explanations for their ultimate
decisions. Similarly, in Gary B., it is possible that the court believed Bonner
Mall did not apply to en banc review. But it is equally likely that the court
either did not consider the issue at all or disregarded Bonner Mall in service
of making a decision based on an intuition about the merits of the case—a

24. 490 F.3d 725, 726 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
25. 858 F.3d 1168, 1168 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
26. See Washington, 858 F.3d at 1174–85 (Bybee, J., dissenting); Veneman, 490 F.3d at
729–35 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
27. See infra Section I.D for an explanation of the various circuits’ local rules concerning
automatic vacatur.
28. See, e.g., Jennifer Finney Boylan, Opinion, Getting Beyond Balls and Strikes, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/23/opinion/getting-beyond-ballsand-strikes.html [perma.cc/PFV5-VCD3].
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decision arguably foreclosed by mootness. Without calls on the balls and
strikes, it is difficult to trust the judicial reasoning behind the outcome.
This Note considers whether federal courts may vacate a panel’s decision
because non-happenstance mootness has arisen while en banc review is still
possible.29 Part I provides an overview of the law of mootness on appeal, surveys debates about the role and purpose of en banc review, and reviews the
current state of judicial decisions on vacatur pending en banc review. Part II
argues that Bonner Mall applies in the en banc context and rebuts several arguments for distinguishing en banc review. Part III highlights the implications
of judicial uncertainty and inconsistency on the issue and proposes reforming
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35 to clarify the correct approach to en
banc vacatur.
I.

MOOTNESS, VACATUR, AND THE ROLE OF EN BANC REVIEW

This Part lays the groundwork for considering whether and when appellate courts should vacate a panel opinion in a case mooted pending en banc
review. Section I.A briefly discusses mootness in general. Section I.B turns to
the equitable remedy of vacatur and explores how the two leading cases on
vacatur and mootness, Munsingwear and Bonner Mall, weigh the private and
public interests both for and against vacatur. To preface how these competing
interests play out in the en banc context, Section I.C delves into the purposes
and policy of en banc review. Last, Section I.D surveys current judicial commentary on vacatur pending en banc review and the interaction between current doctrine and local rules directing automatic vacatur in advance of en banc
rehearing.
A. Mootness in General
Article III and principles of justiciability create jurisdictional limitations
on federal courts that confine those courts to the resolution of disputes rather
than exposition of the law untethered to a case or controversy.30 One such jurisdictional limitation is mootness.31 The Supreme Court has explained that
mootness exists where the parties no longer have a “concrete interest, however
small, in the outcome of the litigation,” making it “impossible for a court to

29. This set of conditions captures the full range of scenarios in which Bonner Mall arguably applies but has not been recognized as controlling.
30. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895) (“The duty of this
court . . . is to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and
not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or
rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue . . . .”). See generally Corey C. Watson, Comment, Mootness and the Constitution, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 143 (1991).
31. It is contested whether mootness is a strict constitutional limitation, as opposed to a
prudential limitation merely derived from Article III. For discussion of this debate, see Watson,
supra note 30, at 150, and Cynthia Chen, Note, Predicated on a Misconception: Analyzing the Problems with the Mootness by Unaccepted Offer Theory, 48 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 501, 508 (2015).
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grant any effectual relief.”32 For example, in Gary B., the settlement mooted
the case because the parties had resolved their dispute via contract, making
the court’s resolution of the legal issue irrelevant to them.33
Nevertheless, Article III does not impose an absolute bar to judicial action
in a moot case. As Justice Scalia wrote in Bonner Mall, although mootness
doctrine prohibits disposition on the merits of a case, it does not “prescribe
such paralysis” as to prevent the court from disposing of the case “as justice
may require.”34 Scalia observed that, without the ability to make decisions
“reasonably ancillary to the primary, dispute-deciding function” of the judiciary, courts would not be able to determine whether they lacked jurisdiction in
the first place, causing a perverse result.35 Bonner Mall recognizes several such
ancillary determinations, including vacatur, a topic the next section will address.36
B. The Equitable Grant of Vacatur After Mootness
If a court with appellate jurisdiction accepts an appeal and the case is
mooted before the court renders a decision on the merits, then the court must
decide whether to vacate the lower-court decision. An “extraordinary remedy,” vacatur must be justified by an equitable weighing of the consequences
for all parties and the public as a whole.37 The equitable considerations concerning vacatur following mootness have been the subject of significant judicial explication, particularly in Munsingwear, Karcher v. May, and Bonner
Mall. The cases distinguish between various types of mootness: happenstance
mootness, mutual voluntary mootness, and mootness caused by unilateral action.38 As explained below, the equitable analysis varies depending on the category of mootness in play.
In Munsingwear, mootness arose by “happenstance” when the government amended the regulatory price controls challenged by the plaintiff after
the district court’s decision but before an appellate decision.39 Happenstance

32. Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013) (quoting Knox v. SEIU, Loc. 1000, 567 U.S.
298, 307–08 (2012)).
33. See Appellants’ Motion to Dismiss the Case as Moot, supra note 10, at 2.
34. U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 21 (1994) (quoting Walling v. James V. Reuter, Inc., 321 U.S. 671, 677 (1944)).
35. Id. at 22 (quoting Chandler v. Jud. Council, 398 U.S. 74, 111 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in denial of writ)).
36. Id. at 21. These judicial actions are authorized by federal statute. 28 U.S.C. § 2106.
37. Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. at 26; see also Andrew S. Tulumello, Case Comment, Shopping
for Legal Precedent Through Settlement-Related Vacatur, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 213, 217 (1996).
38. See Tulumello, supra note 37, at 217–18; Robert Scott Lewis, Recent Decision, U.S.
Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership: Settlement Conditioned on Vacatur?, 47 ALA.
L. REV. 883, 888–91 (1996).
39. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 37, 40 (1950).
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mootness can stem from changes in the law of this kind,40 as well as from other
unpredictable events like the death of a party.41 In sum, happenstance mootness is mootness caused by anything outside the parties’ control.42 The Munsingwear Court determined that the mootness not only justified vacatur but
compelled it. Observing that vacatur was typical practice of federal courts in
cases moot on appeal, the Court also found that the practice was equitable
based on two primary policy concerns. First, courts should “prevent a judgment, unreviewable because of mootness, from spawning any legal consequences” adverse to the party that lost below.43 This imperative is based on
promoting fairness to the parties. Happenstance mootness frustrates a litigant’s right to full review of their case, which can be harmful because of preclusive effects or because of adverse precedent if the party is a repeat player.
Munsingwear indicated that such harm should be remedied by wiping the
slate clean. Second, courts should vacate in order to “clear[] the path for future
relitigation.”44 This rationale is based on a concern about creating a clear and
correct body of law. Cases artificially halted before corrective appellate review
takes place may suffer from legal flaws.45 Thus, in Munsingwear, the Court
aligned vacatur with party interests as well as the public interest in forming a
clear and accurate body of law.46
The Court first addressed the proper vacatur procedure in instances of
non-happenstance mootness in Karcher v. May. In Karcher, the losing party—
the defendant—unilaterally mooted the case after the court of appeals rendered a decision but before the defendant filed a petition for certiorari.47 The
defendant was the New Jersey legislature, which had undergone a party leadership change and refused to continue defending the statute at issue, mooting
the case.48 The Court held that this kind of mootness, unlike the happenstance
mootness in Munsingwear, did not justify vacatur because the losing party below essentially “declined to pursue its appeal.”49 Thus, under the equitable

40. E.g., N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525, 1526 (2020);
United States v. Alaska S.S. Co., 253 U.S. 113, 115–16 (1920).
41. E.g., Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 4 (1988); Dove v. United States, 423 U.S. 325 (1976).
42. Lewis, supra note 38, at 889–90.
43. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 41.
44. Id. at 40.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 40–41.
47. Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 76 (1987). The case was a First Amendment challenge to
a New Jersey statute requiring public schools to observe a period of silence at the beginning of
the day. The plaintiffs successfully argued in the district court and court of appeals that the statute had a religious purpose violative of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 74–76.
48. Id. at 76, 81.
49. Id. at 83.
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analysis of Munsingwear, unilateral mootness justifies vacatur when the prevailing party acts to foreclose appellate review but not when the losing party
does so.50
Bonner Mall, a bankruptcy case, built on Karcher by addressing another
variant of non-happenstance mootness—mutual voluntary mootness—which
usually takes the form of settlement. After the Supreme Court granted certiorari, the case became moot because the parties stipulated to a restructuring
plan.51 Holding that vacatur was inappropriate, the Court explained that, like
unilateral action of the losing party, mutual mootness did not justify vacatur
unless “exceptional circumstances” counseled otherwise.52
Bonner Mall also laid out the policy considerations exempting mutual
mootness from the general Munsingwear rule. The Court first explained that,
where mootness results from a mutual agreement, the party who lost below
“voluntarily forfeited his legal remedy by the ordinary processes of appeal or
certiorari, thereby surrendering his claim to the equitable remedy of vacatur.”53 Any adverse legal consequences stemming from the lower-court opinion would be consequences to which the parties had agreed by waiving their
opportunity to appeal.54 For the Court, this analysis formed the “primary basis” for denying vacatur: without a fairness issue at stake, equitable vacatur
finds scarce justification based on the interests of the litigants.55
Aside from the issue of fairness to private parties, the Court explained
how public interests also weighed against equitable vacatur following mutual
mootness. First, Bonner Mall described a substantial public interest in the
preservation of precedential rulings that militates in favor of a rule against

50. Id. The rule prevents gamesmanship. Consider Washington v. Trump. If the circuit
court upheld a version of the travel ban and the Trump administration subsequently changed its
policy, the plaintiffs would have been saddled with negative Ninth Circuit precedent with no
way to challenge it further, all due to maneuvering by the government. See 858 F.3d 1168, 1168
(9th Cir. 2017) (en banc); see also Tafas v. Kappos, 586 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc)
(declining to vacate a district-court opinion where the government rescinded the rule at issue
but had lost in the district court).
51. U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 20 (1994).
52. Id. at 29. The Court clarified that the exceptional-circumstances exception is not a
broad escape hatch. Specifically, the Court noted that party consent to vacatur would not generally qualify as an exceptional circumstance because it “neither diminishes the voluntariness of
the abandonment of review nor alters any of the policy considerations” underlying the decision.
Id. For a discussion of situations in which lower courts have invoked the exception, such as
trademark cases where vacatur is essential for facilitating settlement, see Paul A. Avron, A Primer
on Vacatur of a Prior Court Order as Part of a Settlement Agreement; Recent Case Law, FED.
LAW., Mar. 2017, at 10, 12–16.
53. Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. at 25.
54. For instance, in Gary B., Michigan governor Gretchen Whitmer exchanged her willingness to allow establishment of a fundamental right to access to literacy, which would potentially give rise to new legal challenges, for an end to the litigation at hand. See Letter to the Court,
supra note 13.
55. Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. at 28.
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vacatur. The Court stated that precedent is “presumptively correct and valuable” rather than “the property of private litigants.”56 This reflects the Court’s
view that precedent is the public’s guide to judicial decisionmaking and that
unnecessary destruction of those guideposts does a disservice to the public.57
Indeed, preserving precedent set in cases settled pending appeal (a fairly common occurrence) advances a host of benefits often invoked in justification of
stare decisis: efficiency, consistency, predictability, and judicial legitimacy.58
Gary B. provides a useful example of how eradication of precedent
through vacatur may affect the public. Most directly, had the panel decision
not been vacated, it would have been binding on other Sixth Circuit courts.59
Future litigants would have benefited from the clarity the decision brought to
a murky and confusing set of precedents regarding the right to access to literacy.60 The Sixth Circuit will likely have to confront the question anew at some
point, creating inefficiency. Additionally, the opinion could have persuaded
courts outside the Sixth Circuit to recognize a fundamental right to access to
literacy in order to avoid an intercircuit conflict, producing efficiency and predictability across the judicial system.61 For instance, shortly after vacatur of
the Gary B. panel decision, the District of Rhode Island issued an opinion in
a very similar case.62 Distinguishing Gary B., the court wrote that even if a
fundamental right to access to literacy existed, the plaintiffs could not extend
that principle to a right to civics education, the topic of the case at hand.63 If

56. Id. at 26.
57. It is reasonable to ask whether the value of vacated precedent is diminished thoroughly enough to justify this aspect of the Court’s concern. See generally Charles A. Sullivan, On
Vacation, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1143 (2006) (examining increased use of vacated precedents). Section
III.B considers in detail whether liberalizing the use of vacated precedent as persuasive authority
would represent a promising reform for counteracting the effects of unwarranted en banc vacatur.
58. See Maggie Gardner, Dangerous Citations, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1619, 1630 (2020) (articulating the policies underlying stare decisis). Critiques of depublishing cases provide a useful
analogy for understanding the adverse consequences wrought by needless vacatur because such
unpublished cases occupy a similarly nonprecedential space. Commentators have decried
depublication as inefficient, confusing to litigants, and harmful to the development of consistent
law. See, e.g., Sarah E. Ricks, The Perils of Unpublished Non-precedential Federal Appellate Opinions: A Case Study of the Substantive Due Process State-Created Danger Doctrine in One Circuit,
81 WASH. L. REV. 217, 222 (2006) (documenting doctrinal confusion in areas of the law rife with
unpublished opinions).
59. 6TH CIR. R. 32.1(b).
60. See Gary B. v. Whitmer, 957 F.3d 616, 648 (6th Cir.) (noting that the “education cases
above” provide “guidance but no answers” on the question of a fundamental right to access to
literacy), vacated en banc, 958 F.3d 1216 (6th Cir. 2020).
61. As discussed infra in Section I.C., Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35 indicates
that one of the justifications for taking a case en banc is to avoid a circuit split, indicating that
courts generally prefer to maintain intercircuit consistency. See also In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“The federal courts spread
across the country owe respect to each other’s efforts and should strive to avoid conflicts . . . .”).
62. A.C. v. Raimondo, 494 F. Supp. 3d 170, 197 (D.R.I. 2020), appeal docketed sub nom.
A.C. v. McKee, No. 20-2082 (1st Cir. argued Nov. 1, 2021).
63. Id. at 192–93.
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such a distinguishing argument had not been available, the court indicated it
would have ruled contrary to Gary B.64 But it is possible that had Gary B. been
the official law of the Sixth Circuit, the District of Rhode Island would have
done otherwise in the interest of maintaining intercircuit consistency, since
the court also recognized that there was “much to admire” about the opinion.65
Beyond the public interest in preserving precedent, the Bonner Mall
Court articulated a second reason to believe the public interest would typically
counsel against vacatur: the need to treat lower-court judgments as “presumptively correct.”66 The Court doubled down on this idea by asserting that the
lower-court opinion should be preserved even when the likelihood of reversal
on appeal is greater than the likelihood of affirmance.67 This part of the opinion sounds in efficiency concerns. Without the presumption of correctness, a
vast portion of judicial opinions would not merit precedential status because
they are not fully reviewed, which would dramatically undercut the efficiency
of judicial review. Bonner Mall’s show of faith in lower courts is also crucial
for legitimacy reasons. Because the overwhelming majority of claims are disposed of by lower courts,68 the public must trust them to faithfully apply the
law.69 Like Munsingwear, Bonner Mall seeks to promote healthy development
of the law by emphasizing the role of precedent. But unlike Munsingwear, the
decision prioritizes preserving law over the concern that unreviewed lowercourt rulings may contain legal defects.
Bonner Mall also took care to define the scope of its applicability to certain
other procedural contexts where mutual mootness may arise. In addition to
cases becoming moot after a grant of certiorari, as was the case in Bonner Mall,
the rule explicitly applies to any case mooted by mutual action pending appeal,
including cases on appeal from district courts and cases in which certiorari
has not yet been granted or denied.70 The Court also seemingly narrowed the
applicability of the rule to appellate review by phrasing the question presented
as follows: “whether appellate courts in the federal system should vacate civil
judgments of subordinate courts in cases that are settled after appeal is filed or

64. Id. (“[Gary B.’s] fate . . . was to be overturned for the reasons explained above and in
the equally well-reasoned dissenting opinion . . . .”).
65. Id. at 175, 193.
66. U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 26 (1994).
67. Id. at 28. The rate of reversal in the courts of appeals is dramatically lower than the
rate of reversal by the Supreme Court. Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and Determinants of the
Decision to Grant En Banc Review, 74 WASH. L. REV. 213, 246 (1999) (“Courts of appeals reverse
only about twenty percent of the cases they review, compared with a reversal rate of sixty to
sixty-five percent for the Supreme Court.”).
68. Between October 1, 2019, and September 30, 2020, 544,460 cases were filed in the
federal district courts and 48,190 were filed in the courts of appeals. Table JCI—U.S. Federal
Courts Judicial Business, U.S. CTS. (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/jci/judicial-business/2020/09/30 [perma.cc/ZM3P-SQTK].
69. See George, supra note 67, at 246 (suggesting the legitimacy of panel decisions depends
on litigant perceptions about panels’ ability to make determinations without en banc review).
70. Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. at 28.
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certiorari sought.”71 On its face, this framing might not appear to include en
banc review. En banc review is termed “rehearing” rather than “appeal,”72 and
a panel may be considered a subset of the same judicial body as an en banc court,
rather than a lower court in relation to it. Given this terminological mismatch,
it is no surprise that courts are unsure about how Bonner Mall does or should
apply to cases mooted pending en banc review.73 Terminology aside, to assess
whether Bonner Mall’s reasoning applies to en banc review, it is necessary to
understand how en banc review functions and what it is designed to achieve.
C. History and Purpose of En Banc Review
En banc rehearing, much like appellate review, simultaneously aims to
create lasting, consistent judicial guidance and an accurate set of precedents.
While most agree that en banc review serves a vital role in promoting efficiency and consistency, disagreement persists about how frequently en banc
courts ought to correct panel errors. That debate informs this Note’s later
analysis of whether en banc review contains distinguishing features that justify
departure from Bonner Mall’s no-vacatur rule.74
The history of en banc review reveals a majoritarian purpose, namely that
of enforcing a circuit’s majority view on any given case.75 En banc review
sprang up as a result of the expansion of the federal courts of appeals, which
were originally composed of only three judges per circuit.76 As caseloads grew
in the early twentieth century, Congress added judgeships to the circuit
courts.77 This prompted some judges to call for a mechanism for full court
review to preserve majority control over developing law,78 a procedure retroactively endorsed by the Supreme Court in Textile Mills.79
Yet the purposes articulated in Textile Mills were not those of majority
control but those of efficiency, promotion of consistent law, and finality of

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 19 (emphases added).
FED. R. APP. P. 35.
See infra Section III.A.
See infra Section II.B.
See FED. R. APP. P. 35.
See Richard S. Arnold, Why Judges Don’t Like Petitions for Rehearing, 3 J. APP. PRAC.
& PROCESS 29, 30–32 (2001); George, supra note 67, at 221–25.
77. George, supra note 67, at 227.
78. Id.
79. Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Comm’r, 314 U.S. 326, 333–35 (1941). En banc review was
not explicitly authorized by the judicial code, but the Court reasoned that it was allowed by the
statute’s text. Id. Several years later, the Court clarified that en banc review was not guaranteed
as of right. W. Pac. R.R. Corp. v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 270 (1953). The Textile Mills
decision was codified in the Judicial Code of 1948, Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869, 871
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 46(c)), and later in Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, first enacted in 1967. Gregory C. Sisk, The Balkanization of Appellate Justice: The
Proliferation of Local Rules in the Federal Circuits, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 5 n.19 (1997).
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judgments in the courts of appeals.80 These purposes underlie Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 35, which sets the current standard for when a circuit
may rehear a case en banc. First, Rule 35 dictates that en banc review is “not
favored,”81 indicating a policy of leaving the bulk of judicial work to panels for
efficiency’s sake despite the potentially countermajoritarian effects of doing
so. The only situations justifying rehearing are those in which en banc review
enforces “uniformity of the court’s decisions”82 or allows the full court to address a question “of exceptional importance.”83 The former prong encompasses uniformity within the circuit, as well as conformity with Supreme
Court precedent.84 The latter category is somewhat vague, but the rule specifies that cases creating or contributing to intercircuit inconsistency are generally ones of exceptional importance.85
With respect to finality, en banc review is thought of as a way to reduce
the Supreme Court’s caseload by managing inconsistency at the circuit level,
preempting the need for certiorari.86 Indeed, Rule 35’s focus on advancing
consistency closely mirrors the role and purpose of Supreme Court review reflected in Supreme Court Rule 10.87 The claim that en banc courts perform a
kind of quasi–Supreme Court review gains force as grants of certiorari become

80. Textile Mills, 314 U.S. at 334–35 (“[T]he result reached makes for more effective judicial administration. Conflicts within a circuit will be avoided. Finality of decision in the circuit
courts of appeal will be promoted. Those considerations are especially important in view of the
fact that in our federal judicial system these courts are the courts of last resort in the run of
ordinary cases.” (footnote omitted)).
81. FED. R. APP. P. 35(a).
82. FED. R. APP. P. 35(a)(1).
83. FED. R. APP. P. 35(a)(2).
84. FED. R. APP. P. 35(b)(1)(A). There is some variation amongst the circuits’ local rules
on these criteria. For instance, the Ninth Circuit rule seems to reject intracircuit conflict as a
reason to grant review. Alexandra Sadinsky, Note, Redefining En Banc Review in the Federal
Courts of Appeals, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2001, 2018–21 (2014).
85. FED. R. APP. P. 35(b)(1)(B). Otherwise, the rule and commentary provide no further
guidance about what qualifies as “exceptional importance.” See Michael E. Solimine, Ideology
and En Banc Review, 67 N.C. L. REV. 29, 56–59 (1988) (setting out proposed factors to make the
analysis more objective).
86. See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 35 advisory committee’s note to 1998 amendment (noting
that “an en banc proceeding provides a safeguard against unnecessary intercircuit conflicts,”
which is important in light of how long it takes the Supreme Court to resolve circuit splits);
Stephen L. Wasby, The Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals En Bancs, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV.
17, 30 (2001) (“For cases in which the justices would be likely to be asked to consider a panel’s
ruling, an en banc hearing might resolve the case and make Supreme Court review unnecessary.”). Indeed, Chief Justice Burger went so far as to advocate for a rule that the en banc court
must rehear any case in which the panel decision created intercircuit conflict in order to help
reduce the Supreme Court’s caseload. See Wasby, supra, at 28.
87. While Rule 10 grants more flexibility and discretion in granting certiorari, it identifies
similar “compelling reasons” for the Court to hear a case. Specifically, Rule 10 emphasizes intercircuit conflicts and conflicts between courts of appeals and state supreme courts, as well as the
existence of an “important question of federal law.” SUP. CT. R. 10(a), (c); see also Solimine, supra
note 85, at 51 (calling the then-analogous Supreme Court rule “remarkably similar” to Rule 35’s
selection criteria).
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more infrequent, leaving a major portion of significant cases and inconsistencies to the lower courts.88 Thus, the current approach to en banc review has
moved away from the historically rooted majority-rule rationale in favor of a
focus on efficiency, consistency, and finality, as indicated in Rule 35.
At the same time, the desire among circuit judges to exert a majoritarian
influence over panel decisions has also found support. Indeed, full courts often use en banc review to correct “errors” committed by panels, in addition to
using the device to promote consistency and head off Supreme Court review.89
But jurists and scholars are split on the question of how vigorously en banc
courts should police for correctness. On one side are a group we might call
“majoritarians,” who believe that en banc review is a mechanism for ensuring
that as many opinions as possible reflect the judicial understanding of the entire circuit.90 On the other side are proponents of the “panel autonomy” approach, who seek to minimize en banc review aimed at error correction.91
Behind the majoritarian view is a conception of the panel as an agent of
the full circuit.92 Majoritarians believe that the legitimacy of the circuit’s law,
created primarily by panels, depends on the ability of the full court to police
for errors.93 In this way, error correction is a quasi–Supreme Court function
because it minimizes the number of cases requiring Supreme Court attention.94 Cognizant of the costs of review, majoritarians maintain that en banc

88. Christopher P. Banks, The Politics of En Banc Review in the “Mini-Supreme Court,” 13
J.L. & POL. 377, 378 (1997) (“[T]he en banc process is significant because a vast majority of circuit
court decisions are denied review by the United States Supreme Court . . . . As a result, the intermediate appellate court becomes, in effect, the ‘court of last resort’ for most federal litigants . . . .”).
89. See, e.g., In re Hyundai & Kia Fuel Econ. Litig., 926 F.3d 539, 555, 561 (9th Cir. 2019)
(en banc) (holding the panel had committed reversible error because it had incorrectly applied
class certification law); Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1302, 1312 (11th Cir. 2011) (en
banc) (correcting a panel’s error). But see Solimine, supra note 85, at 48 (noting inconsistency in
the case law and scholarship about whether “mere disagreement” with a panel’s decision is sufficient reason to rehear en banc).
90. E.g., Douglas H. Ginsburg & Donald Falk, The Court En Banc: 1981–1990, 59 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1008, 1011, 1034 (1991) (expressing a preference for panel decisions to come “as
close as possible” to reflecting “the views of the court as a whole”).
91. Arthur D. Hellman, “The Law of the Circuit” Revisited: What Role for Majority Rule?,
32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 625, 625–26, 629–31 (2008) (describing the split).
92. See Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 90, at 1012 (“Delegating to a panel the responsibility
for an initial decision does not relieve the full court of its own responsibility for the ultimate
decision in the case.”).
93. Id. at 1013.
94. This issue took center stage in a late-1990s effort to reform the Ninth Circuit because
the circuit’s size was perceived as preventing it from adequately supervising panel decisions for
correctness. Arthur D. Hellman, Getting t Right: Panel Error and the En Banc Process in the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 425, 426–27 (2000). Supporting a structural
change, Justice Scalia wrote that “the function of en banc hearings . . . is not only to eliminate
intra-circuit conflicts, but also to correct and deter panel opinions that are pretty clearly wrong.”
Letter from Justice Antonin Scalia to Justice Byron R. White (Aug. 21, 1998), in Review of the
Report by the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals Regarding
the Ninth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit Reorganization Act: Hearing on S. 253 Before the S.
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review is only necessary when the graveness of the error outweighs the time
and resources such review incurs.95
By contrast, supporters of panel autonomy prioritize the efficiency of
panel independence, its benefits for circuit legitimacy, and the positive effects
of the countermajoritarian influence of panels. First, they contend that the
benefits of correcting most errors are not worth the vast expenditure of resources involved in asking large groups of judges in the circuit to rehear a
case.96 In fact, some assert that the bigger the error, the worse the tradeoff,
because the common law process is adept at weakening especially aberrant
opinions.97 Additionally, while majoritarians suggest that frequent en banc review augments panel legitimacy, proponents of panel autonomy flip that argument, asserting that frequent review engenders doubt about the correctness
of panel decisions as a whole.98 Finally, former Ninth Circuit chief judge James
Browning has argued that panel autonomy gives a measure of “breathing
room for the minority,” creating a pluralistic structure which allows for a diversity of viewpoints in the circuit’s law.99 On this account, minority contributions create long-term jurisprudential stability because changes in the
political composition of a circuit do not necessarily portend dramatic shifts in
the law.100 The panel-autonomy approach does not argue against all error correction, but it construes Rule 35 narrowly to discourage review of decisions
based on mere disagreement within the circuit.101

Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 72, 72 (1999) (statement of Hon. Pamela Ann Rymer, Circuit J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit). To support his view that the Ninth Circuit
had failed to carry out this function, Justice Scalia cited the “disproportionate segment” of the
Court’s docket devoted to reversing erroneous Ninth Circuit panel rulings. Id.
95. Hellman, supra note 91, at 629.
96. The Second Circuit has notoriously eschewed extensive en banc review in a
“longstanding tradition of general deference to panel adjudication.” Ricci v. DeStafano, 530 F.3d
88, 89 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Katzman, J., concurring). Former chief judge of the Second
Circuit Irving Kaufman has explained that, as a result, the Second Circuit has been able to “manage [its] case load efficiently” and “generate[] certainty, finality and respect for [its] panel opinions.” Hon. Irving R. Kaufman, Remarks at the Annual Judicial Conference of the Second
Judicial Circuit of the United States (Sept. 13, 1984), in 106 F.R.D. 103, 159 (1985).
97. Arthur Hellman explains that those in favor of panel autonomy “believe that the best
corrective for aberrant panels decisions generally will not be found in immediate en banc review,
but in the evolutionary processes of law over time.” Hellman, supra note 94, at 453. This is the
case because “the more aberrant a decision, the more likely it is that other panels will be able to
distinguish it in a credible and cogent way.” Hellman, supra note 91, at 637. Such normalization
is especially effective where opinions have broad applicability because panels address the issue
more frequently. Id.
98. See Kaufman, supra note 96, at 159.
99. Id. at 161–62.
100. Id. at 161.
101. Id. at 162; see also Phil Zarone, Agenda Setting in the Courts of Appeals: The Effect of
Ideology on En Banc Rehearings, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 157, 165–66 (2000) (arguing that a
strict textual application of Rule 35 may preclude routine correction of panel decisions, depending on how capaciously one reads “exceptional importance”).
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In sum, en banc review aims to achieve judicial efficiency, consistency,
and legitimacy, as well as accuracy in circuit law. This last function may compete with the preceding ones, and commentators are divided on how to balance the various interests in question.
D. Doctrinal Incoherence in Vacatur Pending En Banc Review and
Automatic Vacatur
With the preceding background on mootness, vacatur, and en banc review concluded, the intersection of those topics in the realm of mootness
pending en banc review102 comes into view. As such, this Section completes
the table-setting by surveying what has already been said about this procedural
posture and what remains troublingly unsaid about it. Finally, this Section
suggests that automatic vacatur of panel opinions following a grant of en banc
review, a procedure contained in many circuits’ local rules, may explain how
and why courts have remained quiet on the subject.
Little judicial discussion of en banc vacatur exists, and what does exist
only scratches the surface of the doctrinal questions at play. Veneman and
Washington v. Trump are the two best examples of a fulsome debate on the
issue, but they are marked by judicial division and leave many questions unanswered. In Veneman, a Ninth Circuit case vacated pending en banc disposition, a concurrence argued that vacatur was justified in light of the
differences between en banc and other appellate review, while a dissent contended that the differences in question were insignificant.103 Ten years later,
in Washington v. Trump, an en banc court of the Ninth Circuit cited Bonner
Mall in declining to vacate a panel’s refusal to stay an injunction against the
Trump administration’s first travel ban order.104 The case became moot pending en banc consideration due to the Trump administration’s change to the
travel ban policy.105 Vehement dissenters ignored Bonner Mall’s no-vacatur

102. An important framing note is that mootness pending en banc review encompasses
several somewhat distinct procedural postures. In the first scenario, “pending en banc consideration,” mootness arises after panel disposition but before en banc review has been requested by
a party (or by any judge on the circuit sua sponte). See FED. R. APP. P. 35 advisory committee’s
note (stating that the rule “does not affect the power of a court of appeals to initiate in banc
hearings sua sponte”). In the second scenario, “pending Rule 35 decision,” mootness occurs after
a petition for rehearing following the panel’s disposition is filed (or after sua sponte consideration has begun). In the last scenario, “pending en banc disposition,” mootness arises after the
court has ordered en banc rehearing but before the en banc court decides the case. These scenarios are collectively referred to using the catchall term “pending en banc review” when distinguishing between them is not relevant to the point at hand.
103. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Veneman, 490 F.3d 725, 726, 728 (Bybee, J., concurring);
id. at 730 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
104. Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1168 (9th Cir.), denying reh’g en banc to 847
F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
105. See Exec. Order No. 13,780, 3 C.F.R. 301 (2018); Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392,
2403–04 (2018). The government then moved to dismiss their appeal in Washington v. Trump
on March 8, voluntarily mooting the case. 858 F.3d at 1168.
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rule, citing “an obligation to correct our own errors.”106 Even if these two
Ninth Circuit cases are reconcilable,107 there is significant disagreement about
the holding in each and little in-depth discussion of their possible differences.
Particularly in Washington v. Trump, the court was divided on the question of
vacatur along political lines, and the opinions suggested the real dispute centered on the merits rather than the applicability of Bonner Mall.108
Other cases involving en banc vacatur demonstrate more serious inattention to the issue. For instance, in Tafas v. Kappos, an en banc court of the Federal Circuit applied the Bonner Mall rule when faced with a motion to vacate
a district-court opinion.109 However, it did not discuss whether Bonner Mall
would require reinstatement of the panel decision in the case, which had been
automatically vacated when the court took up the case en banc.110 Cases like
Gary B. and Tafas, neither of which even consider how vacatur operates in the
en banc context, are the norm. In short, this doctrine is a mess, and it often
receives short shrift.
Automatic-vacatur rules, which this Note describes more fully below, enable courts to avoid serious, reasoned consideration of the doctrinal questions
posed in these cases. Automatic vacatur carried out before a case becomes
moot diminishes the need to address the propriety of vacating a panel opinion.
This was the case in Tafas, where leaving the panel opinion vacated was the
status quo.111 More strikingly, these rules can be employed to vacate without
providing reasoned justification at any point when en banc review is still possible. For instance, the court’s decision in Gary B. to rehear the case en banc
when it was already moot accomplished post-mootness vacatur without
meaningful judicial consideration.112 Thus, automatic vacatur enables courts

106. Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d at 1174–78 (Bybee, J., dissenting). Judge Bybee indicated the court either had free-floating discretion under Bonner Mall and Munsingwear to vacate, or that, in the alternative, it was possible to shoehorn vacatur into Bonner Mall’s narrow
exception for “extraordinary circumstances.” Id. at 1177.
107. A concurrence in Washington v. Trump distinguished Veneman by noting that case
was mooted pending en banc disposition, whereas the case at hand was mooted pending en banc
consideration. Id. at 1169–70 (Berzon, J., concurring).
108. Compare Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d at 1168 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (indicating agreement with the panel’s decision to “vigorously protect[] the constitutional rights of
all”), and id. at 1169 (Berzon, J., concurring) (expressing “full confidence in the panel’s decision”
and disapproving of “the merits commentary in the dissents”), with id. at 1171 (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting) (“I write separately to highlight two peculiar features of the panel’s opinion.”), and
id. at 1175 (Bybee, J., dissenting) (“I dissent from our failure to correct the panel’s manifest error.”), and id. at 1185 (Bea, J., dissenting) (“I write separately to emphasize a serious error in the
panel’s conclusion . . . .”).
109. 586 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc).
110. Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir.), vacated en banc, 328 F. App’x 658 (Fed. Cir.
2009). The same was true in Staley v. Harris County, 485 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 2007), dismissing
appeal from 332 F. Supp. 2d 1030 (S.D. Tex. 2004).
111. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 12–17 and accompanying text.

522

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 120:505

to disregard Bonner Mall in the en banc setting across a range of procedural
postures because courts can order en banc review post-mootness.113
Importantly, the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure do not even address automatic vacatur, let alone dictate it.114 Nevertheless, several circuits
employ local automatic-vacatur rules, which direct that the presumptive effect
of granting en banc review is to wipe the slate clean, preparing the circuit to
rule anew. The local rules concerning vacatur following a decision to take a
case en banc can be roughly categorized into three groups. First are the rules
which require vacatur upon a grant of en banc rehearing without caveat or
qualification. The Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits all adhere to
rules of this nature.115 The Ninth Circuit stands somewhat apart from this
group in that it does not vacate panel decisions, but automatically deems them
nonprecedential upon grant of en banc rehearing.116 Second are the rules
which require vacatur as a default but allow for deviation in individual cases.
The First, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits abide by such rules.117 Third are the
rules, adopted by both the D.C. Circuit and the Tenth Circuit, which require
that the panel’s judgment—but not its opinion—be vacated unless otherwise
specified.118 The Second, Eighth, and Federal Circuits have no rules on automatic vacatur: while the Second Circuit seems to follow no established vacatur
practice,119 the Eighth and Federal Circuits appear to vacate as a matter of
course, thus engaging in de facto automatic vacatur.120 What all these rules
have in common is that they do not require explanation. To vacate the panel’s
decision, en banc courts need only include a citation to the rule in question (if

113. This Note does not take a position on whether this is jurisdictionally appropriate but
only points out that it has happened before, as in Gary B. One reason we might want courts to
be able to take cases en banc post-mootness is to promote efficiency when the mootness itself is
questionable, allowing the en banc court to consider mootness and the merits—if applicable—
at the same time. Further examination would be necessary to address the question fully.
114. See FED. R. APP. P. 35.
115. 3D CIR. I.O.P. 9.5.9; 4TH CIR. R. 35(c); 6TH CIR. R. 35(b); 7TH CIR. I.O.P. 5(e).
116. 9TH CIR. G.O. 5.5(d). The difference may be illusory. See Animal Legal Def. Fund v.
Veneman, 490 F.3d 725, 727 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (calling the difference between nonprecedential status and vacatur “minuscule”).
117. 1ST CIR. I.O.P. X(D); 5TH CIR. R. 41.3; 11TH CIR. R. 35-10.
118. 10TH CIR. R. 35.6; D.C. CIR. R. 35(d). This regime creates a somewhat odd situation
in the case of a panel opinion reaching the correct outcome through flawed reasoning, as was
the case in United States v. Graham. See 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
119. See, e.g., Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., No. 15-3775, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 13127
(2d Cir. May 25, 2017). This fact comports with the Second Circuit’s unique approach to en banc
review. The circuit very rarely hears cases en banc, showing a greater degree of deference to
panels. See supra note 96.
120. See, e.g., Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc., v. Swanson, No. 10-3126, 2011 U.S.
App. LEXIS 26399 (8th Cir. July 12, 2011), vacating en banc 640 F.3d 304 (8th Cir. 2011); United
States v. Andis, No. 01-1272, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 5944 (8th Cir. Apr. 2, 2002), vacating en
banc 277 F.3d 284 (8th Cir. 2002); Kirkendall v. Dep’t of the Army, 159 F. App’x 193 (Fed. Cir.
2006), vacating en banc 412 F.3d 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2005); NantKwest, Inc. v. Matal, 869 F.3d 1327
(Fed. Cir.), vacating en banc 860 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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it exists),121 and if the case becomes moot while under en banc review, the rules
do not require giving any thought to reinstating the panel opinion.122
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 47(a)(1) empowers the circuits to
create local rules that fill out details left unclear by the federal rules.123 But the
local rules must be consistent with the rules enacted by Congress.124 While the
federal rules are presumptively valid and a federal rule has never been struck
down, the local rules, which are not enacted by Congress, are more commonly
invalidated.125 In fact, local rules expanding on Rule 35 have previously been
called into question.126 Local rules are also vulnerable to constitutional challenges.127 Thus, although local circuit rules provide for automatic vacatur, they
are not supported by unassailable authority. With this background established, this Note examines whether compelling reasons exist to deviate from
Bonner Mall in the en banc setting.
II.

BONNER MALL’S ANALYSIS AND EN BANC REVIEW: DISTINCTIONS
WITHOUT A DIFFERENCE

The question addressed in this Part is whether Bonner Mall should be read
to govern scenarios in which a case is settled pending en banc review. Section
II.A argues that because Bonner Mall’s equitable rationale is not altered by the
particularities of the en banc setting, the case should be read to apply to en
banc review despite it not stating so outright. Section II.B reviews several arguments distinguishing mootness pending en banc review from the scenarios
discussed in Bonner Mall and concludes that they fall short.
A. Bonner Mall’s Equitable Analysis Does Not Vary in En Banc Review
Bonner Mall recognizes that vacatur, like other equitable remedies, should
only be granted to remedy some injustice. It applied that concept to the category of cases involving mootness pending appeal, although as a general matter

121. See, e.g., Gary B. v. Whitmer, 958 F.3d 1216 (6th Cir. 2020) (en banc).
122. Only the Fifth Circuit’s rules include any mention of possible reinstatement, which occurs when the court has voted to rehear a case en banc but then cannot come to a conclusion on it. In
that scenario, the panel decision is reinstated but rendered nonprecedential. See 5TH CIR. R. 41.3.
123. FED. R. APP. P. 47(a)(1).
124. Id.
125. Matthew J. Dowd, Rule 36 Decisions at the Federal Circuit: Statutory Authority, 21
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 857, 868 (2019).
126. See, e.g., United States v. Samuels, 808 F.2d 1298, 1299 (8th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (Lay,
C.J., concurring) (suggesting that Eighth Circuit’s rule allowing a judge to request rehearing en banc
sua sponte is inconsistent with Rule 35, which provides only for a “party” to seek such rehearing).
127. A prominent example of one such challenge came in Anastasoff v. United States,
where the Eighth Circuit determined that its circuit rule allowing for the designation of cases as
unpublished, and therefore nonprecedential, was an unconstitutional use of the “judicial power”
under Article III. 223 F.3d 898, 899 (8th Cir. 2000). Ultimately, the Federal Rules were amended
to partially account for this concern by requiring circuits to allow citation to unpublished cases.
See Sullivan, supra note 57, at 1164 (noting the adoption of Rule 32.1).
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it is still true that some case-by-case determination is necessary to answer the
question of whether injustice will result from foregoing vacatur. This Section
argues that as a baseline matter, neither private injustice nor public benefit—
the two justifications Bonner Mall gives for post-mootness vacatur—warrant
vacatur in the en banc context any more than they do in the contexts addressed directly in Bonner Mall. Performing the equitable balancing of interests reveals that differences between en banc review and Supreme Court
review, the subject of Bonner Mall itself, are minimal. In fact, they are less significant than the differences between Supreme Court review and initial appellate review, to which the Bonner Mall rule explicitly applies. Thus, Bonner
Mall should be read to extend to mootness pending en banc review despite the
opinion’s silence on the subject.
With respect to the private injustice that typically justifies vacatur in moot
cases—namely, legal consequences the losing party was unfairly prevented
from challenging—en banc review is no different from other forms of appellate review. Regardless of whether a party settles pending review by a panel,
en banc court, or the Supreme Court, a settling party waives the right to further consideration of the case and accepts any attendant legal consequences.128
To be sure, when the parties settle after a decision to rehear en banc accompanied by automatic vacatur, they probably settle with the understanding that
the panel decision will not stand. Frustration of that expectation might constitute an injustice.129 But this argument assumes that allowing automatic vacatur or leaving vacatur in place post-mootness is appropriate. The parties’
expectations should not be based on an unexamined practice inconsistent
with law in the first place.
Some forms of mootness pending en banc review are less likely to result
in private injustice than mootness pending initial appellate review because en
banc review is discretionary. The private interest in the vacatur of an adverse
lower-court opinion is strongest when a party has a right to appellate review
because such review is certain to occur if sought.130 By contrast, the rarity of
Supreme Court and en banc review means that an appellate opinion in a case
mooted by settlement would have likely stood even if a party petitioned for
higher review. The argument that appellate review as of right is different than
discretionary appellate review for purposes of vacatur was popular before the
ruling in Bonner Mall131 and was occasionally referred to even after Bonner

128. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text.
129. Conversely, vacating a case mooted pending en banc consideration, as the dissenters
sought to do in Washington v. Trump, see 858 F.3d 1168, 1177–78 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc)
(Bybee, J., dissenting), might upset party expectations that the panel ruling would stand.
130. See Humphreys v. DEA, 105 F.3d 112, 115 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Because the Supreme
Court’s review of appellate court decisions is, for the most part, discretionary, the Court’s failure
to vacate judgment in a moot case ordinarily will not deprive a losing party of a review on the merits
to which it is entitled.” (quoting Finberg v. Sullivan, 658 F.2d 93, 96 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc))).
131. See, e.g., Kipp D. Snider, The Vacatur Remedy for Cases Becoming Moot upon Appeal:
In Search of a Workable Solution for the Federal Courts, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1642, 1673–74
(1992) (proposing, based on the dissenting opinion in Clarke v. United States, 915 F.2d 699 (D.C.
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Mall held that initial appellate review was covered by the no-vacatur rule.132
The Court’s rejection of the argument notwithstanding, en banc review fits
the Bonner Mall mold even better than initial appellate review.133 This suggests
the private interest in vacatur is weakest in cases mooted pending en banc
consideration and Rule 35 decisions, although further review is certainly frustrated in cases mooted pending en banc disposition.
If there is no private injustice in vacatur pending en banc review beyond
that at play in initial appellate and Supreme Court review, the only question
is whether any public interest in post-mootness vacatur is heightened in the
en banc context. Bonner Mall identifies preservation of precedent as the main
public interest served by the no-vacatur rule.134 While district-court opinions
may have some meaningful precedential influence,135 binding precedent has a
more tangible impact on the law of a circuit. Indeed, most circuits abide by
norms or rules preventing a panel from overruling another panel’s decision.136
In those circuits, panel decisions are ostensibly binding on all courts except
the en banc court. As such, the public interest in preserving precedent is
stronger in en banc review than in one of the contexts explicitly contemplated
by Bonner Mall. Both en banc review’s discretionary nature and the precedential value of panel decisions, then, militate for a no-vacatur default rule in the
en banc context.
Although Bonner Mall did not mention en banc review in its decision, the
only circuit-court case cited in Bonner Mall’s discussion of vacatur following
mutual mootness involved mootness pending en banc consideration,137 as did

Cir. 1990) (en banc), that the determinative factor in granting vacatur should be whether further
appellate review would have been granted).
132. Humphreys, 105 F.3d at 115; U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S.
18, 28 (1994).
133. In fact, en banc review is rarer than a grant of certiorari, so in this narrow sense, en
banc review fits the mold better than the paradigmatic application. Take 2010 as a representative
year: en banc rehearing occurred at a rate of approximately 0.15%, while Supreme Court review
was taken in 1.15% of petitions. See Sadinsky, supra note 84, at 2015 (explaining that in 2010
only 45 out of 30,914 appellate cases were heard en banc across the circuits); Statistics as of June
29, 2011, J. SUP. CT. U.S., Oct. Term 2010, at II, https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/journal/jnl10.pdf [perma.cc/P58L-9E77] (reporting that 90 out of 7,857 petitions for certiorari filed
in the 2010 term were granted). The extremely low rate of en banc rehearing reflects in part that
the denominator in the calculation is all cases decided on appeal, since the en banc court—unlike
the Supreme Court—can order rehearing sua sponte.
134. Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. at 26.
135. See Gardner, supra note 58, at 1629–37 (arguing that the principles of stare decisis
often justify “horizontal” citation by district courts).
136. Amy E. Sloan, The Dog That Didn’t Bark: Stealth Procedures and the Erosion of Stare
Decisis in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 713, 718–19, 719 nn.29–30 (2009)
(citing cases and local rules demonstrating that “[e]very circuit follows the law of the circuit rule”).
137. See Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. at 28; Mfrs. Hanover Tr. Co. v. Yanakas, 11 F.3d 381, 382
(2d Cir. 1993).
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Karcher v. May, which featured prominently in the opinion.138 It is also telling
that scholarship on the subject in the run up to Bonner Mall assumed that any
rule the Court set out in that case would apply to en banc vacation of panel
decisions.139 Thus, no solid negative inference can be drawn from the opinion,
particularly given the congruence between Bonner Mall’s reasoning and the
preceding analysis of the equities in en banc review.
B. Three Unpersuasive Distinguishing Arguments
Despite the strong affirmative case that Bonner Mall extends to cases
mooted pending en banc review discussed in the previous Section, some
judges and commentators have concluded that it does not. In what little ink
has been spilled on whether Bonner Mall applies to en banc vacatur,140 judges
and scholars have relied on several unique features of en banc review to distinguish the no-vacatur rule. First, some have argued that en banc courts conduct internal self-review, not appellate review. Second, some have contended
that an en banc court that leaves a panel opinion in place post-mootness violates the constraints of Article III by letting the mandate issue141 on a moot
case. Third, others have maintained that a decision to rehear en banc carries
with it serious doubts about the validity of the panel opinion, justifying vacatur in cases mooted pending en banc disposition. These arguments suggest
that deviation from the no-vacatur rule in the en banc–review context makes
sense because en banc courts are particularly well positioned to correct errors.
This Section contends that each of these arguments falls short.
1.

Self-Review Versus Appellate Review

The first argument distinguishing Bonner Mall in the en banc review context fails because it is based on a misleading description of en banc review, one
that would not justify deviating from the no-vacatur rule even if it were accurate. This argument, which we might call the “self-review distinction,” begins
with the observation that appellate courts review lower-court opinions while
en banc courts supersede opinions issued by their colleagues. In Veneman,
Judge Bybee of the Ninth Circuit took a stand against en banc adherence to

138. See Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. at 26. In Karcher v. May, mootness arose after circuit-court
disposition but before the petition for certiorari that brought the case to the Court was filed,
meaning that en banc review was still possible when the case was mooted. 484 U.S. 72, 76 (1987).
139. See Judith Resnik, Whose Judgment? Vacating Judgments, Preferences for Settlement,
and the Role of Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1471, 1483
(1994) (“[A]t issue in Bonner Mall is the interrelationship between the pendency of a case (on
appeal, on petition for rehearing en banc, on cert.) and settlement.” (emphasis added)); Snider,
supra note 131, at 1674–75 (proposing a vacatur framework “developed for any procedural posture whereby cases become moot during the appellate process in the federal courts” and explaining applicability in en banc review).
140. See supra notes 106–110 and accompanying text.
141. The mandate is a procedural device that transfers jurisdiction between district and
circuit courts. See discussion infra Section II.B.2.
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Bonner Mall based on this reasoning.142 Later in Washington v. Trump, Judge
Bybee argued that even if Bonner Mall did apply, the circuit’s “obligation to
correct [its] own errors” is an exceptional circumstance exempting en banc
review from the no-vacatur rule.143 In other words, he contends that internal
quality control is different from quality control from on high. Judge Bybee’s
reasoning has minimal significance as to whether Bonner Mall applies because
en banc courts do not perform a meaningfully different kind of review than
other appellate courts, particularly the Supreme Court. And even if they did,
it would not matter because self-review does not support a permissive approach to vacatur in other contexts.
First, characterizing en banc review as self-review obscures its hierarchical function. The debate about panel autonomy surveyed in Section I.C
concerns just how much control the en banc court should exert over its subsidiary components, suggesting a hierarchical structure involving control by a
superior judicial body.144 Further, actual self-review of panel opinions is available in the form of panel rehearing.145 Notably, a petition for panel rehearing
requires the petitioner to explain what the panel originally “overlooked or
misapprehended,”146 while petitions for en banc rehearing need not contain
such details.147 The unwritten principle is that true self-review only changes
the outcome when the original decisionmakers see things differently or discover new information. By contrast, hierarchical review may change the outcome even if the original decisionmakers have not changed their minds
because new decisionmakers have a controlling vote. To be sure, members of
the panel most often have a say in the en banc ruling,148 and their adherence
to their original stance may matter in the final vote. But since only one circuit

142. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Veneman, 490 F.3d 725, 727–28 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc)
(Bybee, J., concurring).
143. Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1174 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Bybee, J., dissenting).
144. See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text. Inherent in this debate is agreement
on the fact of en banc control, even if disagreement persists on the prudence of using that control
frequently.
145. FED. R. APP. P. 40.
146. Id. at 40(a)(2).
147. Id. at 35(b) (requiring that petitioners for en banc review state either why the panel
decision conflicts with circuit or Supreme Court precedent or involves a question of exceptional
importance). The Appellate Rules Committee has recently suggested it may abrogate Rule 35
and fold it into Rule 40 to reduce litigant confusion regarding simultaneous petitions for panel
and en banc rehearing. But this change would not collapse the different standards for obtaining
panel versus en banc rehearing. ADVISORY COMM. ON APP. RULES, APRIL 2021 AGENDA BOOK
125–31 (2021), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/appellate_agenda_book_spring_
2021_final.pdf [perma.cc/8YC4-SQWF]. Thanks to Professor Edward Cooper for bringing this
possible change to my attention.
148. See, e.g., 1ST CIR. R. 35.0(a)(2)(A) (directing that the en banc court be composed of all
active judges on the circuit, as well as any senior judge who sat on the panel in the case); 2D CIR.
I.O.P. 35.1(c) (same). A district-court judge sitting as a visiting judge on a panel may be an exception, although this scenario is not mentioned explicitly in the rules. See id.

528

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 120:505

is small enough for the original three-judge panel to be possibly determinative
of the outcome on rehearing,149 only panel rehearing is truly self-review, while
en banc rehearing more closely resembles hierarchical review. Finally, the hierarchical nature of en banc rehearing is evidenced by the previously noted
rule, operative in most or all circuits, that panels may not contradict precedent
created by other panels while the en banc court can.150 This power to supersede indicates that en banc courts exist on a higher tier of the judicial process
than panels.
Second, that en banc rulings supersede panel opinions rather than reverse
them does not support the self-review distinction. Judge Bybee’s observation
that en banc courts review district-court opinions rather than panel opinions
because the latter are supplanted by en banc disposition151 is a formalistic distinction that does little work. Technically, the Supreme Court reviews a circuit
court’s findings and affirms or reverses that opinion rather than the district
court’s findings. But descriptively, such review operates the same as en banc
review because it addresses legal issues de novo and defers to the district
court’s findings of fact.152 The Court is not bound by the legal or factual determinations of the court of appeals, just as the en banc court is not bound by the
panel decision.153
Third, even in procedural postures involving undeniable self-review,
courts have made no claim to unlimited ability to vacate post-mootness. For
instance, in United States v. Flute, a panel reviewing its own decision postmootness held that vacatur was not appropriate.154 Similarly, the Supreme
Court has no established rule or practice of vacating its prior decision when it
decides to rehear a case, and in at least some instances, it has not done so.155

149. The First Circuit is the smallest circuit, with only six active judgeships. 28 U.S.C. § 44.
Whether a three-judge panel can determine the outcome of an en banc rehearing depends on
the participation of any eligible senior judges and the panel’s unanimity.
150. See supra note 136.
151. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Veneman, 490 F.3d 725, 728 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc)
(Bybee, J., concurring) (“We do not affirm or reverse the panel; rather, we review the judgment
of the lower court.”).
152. See, e.g., Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 577 (1985) (reversing Fourth Circuit’s determination that the trial court’s finding of facts were clearly erroneous “[b]ased on our
own reading of the record”).
153. The discussion of the aims of en banc review in Section I.C confirms that en banc
courts are generally charged with the quasi-appellate function of maintaining consistency and
accuracy, one that in many ways mirrors exactly the kind of review conducted by the Supreme
Court. See supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text; Solimine, supra note 85, at 41 (comparing
en banc review and appellate review generally).
154. 951 F.3d 908, 910 (8th Cir. 2020) (citing Arizonans for Off. Eng. v. Arizona, 520 U.S.
43, 71–72 (1997) (citing U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 26 (1994))).
155. Compare Boumediene v. Bush, 551 U.S. 1160, 1161 (2007) (reversing prior denial of
certiorari and vacating prior order at the same time), with Kinsella v. Krueger, 352 U.S. 901, 901–
02 (1956) (granting rehearing but not vacating prior order). Although the Supreme Court has vacated an opinion in a case settled pending Supreme Court rehearing at least once, it did not

December 2021]

Vacatur Pending En Banc Review

529

As such, even court action accurately described as self-review does not universally distinguish otherwise applicable vacatur rules.
Cast as an assertion that en banc courts have a unique need and entitlement to correct the circuit court’s own errors, Judge Bybee’s distinction warrants further consideration. The idea is that because en banc review is a means
of majority control and a useful tool for error correction, en banc vacatur
serves the public interest when deployed in those ways.156 Even accepting that
majoritarian control and intensive correction of panel errors are legitimate
aims of en banc review,157 it is untrue that the en banc setting presents an especially strong case for vacatur on those bases. The Supreme Court is similarly
poised to serve the public interest by vacating post-mootness to correct errors
and maintain control over the judiciary.
Like en banc courts, the Supreme Court maintains an efficient and legitimate judiciary by exerting control over the judicial bodies that act as its
agents.158 This is largely the same interest that forms the basis of the majoritarian claim to en banc control over panel decisions.159 To the extent that agent
fidelity varies according to how often a principal can exert control over the
agent, the Supreme Court may have a stronger incentive to correct errors than
en banc courts do because the Supreme Court has fewer opportunities to reprimand appellate courts. This is primarily the case because the Court’s caseload is highly restricted. The nine justices cannot feasibly respond to as high a
proportion of cases as a circuit sitting en banc can, where the labor of flagging
cases for review, drafting opinions, and participating in oral argument can be
divided between more judges.160 The Court also has less control over the cases
it hears because the litigants must appeal for certiorari to be granted.161 Thus,
express a general rule in that pre–Bonner Mall decision. See Stewart v. S. Ry. Co., 315 U.S. 784
(1942) (per curiam).
156. Dissenting in Veneman, Judge Thomas noted that “there is no principled distinction
to be drawn between” en banc and appellate review because Bonner Mall did not hold that “vacatur is an ‘extraordinary remedy’ only some of the time.” Veneman, 490 F.3d at 730 (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 26 (1994)).
In other words, vacatur is an equitable doctrine even when employed in the course of a court’s
self-review. Judge Thomas is correct, but a charitable reading of Judge Bybee’s argument is that
the equitable calculus simply comes out differently in en banc review.
157. The extent to which en banc courts should act as error correctors is not universally
agreed upon. See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text.
158. Susan B. Haire, Stefanie A. Lindquist & Donald R. Songer, Appellate Court Supervision in the Federal Judiciary: A Hierarchical Perspective, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 143, 161 (2003)
(finding empirical evidence that circuits more frequently scrutinized by the Supreme Court reverse district-court opinions more frequently in order to conform their rulings to the Court’s
preferences). This comparison could be repeated with respect to initial appellate review, in which
similar agency principles operate and the need to correct errors exists. Id. at 144–45.
159. See George, supra note 67, at 244–46 (explaining principal-agent dynamics between
en banc courts and panels).
160. Other than the First Circuit, which has six, every circuit has at least eleven judgeships
authorized by Congress. 28 U.S.C. § 44.
161. Even when petitions for certiorari come before the Supreme Court, lower courts may
craft their opinions to exploit the Court’s reliance on certain signals of cert-worthiness and avoid
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opportunities to impose control are more significant for the Supreme Court,
and yet, by adhering to Bonner Mall, the Court relinquishes that interest in
order to promote the public interest in preserving precedent.
The Supreme Court would also serve the public interest by vacating
whenever error seemed to be afoot. Common wisdom holds that the Supreme
Court does not deal in error correction162 and it is certainly not as well positioned to make frequent corrections given its restricted caseload. But this does
not mean the Court cannot correct errors when it chooses to do so. It would
be more accurate to say, as the Court’s rules implicitly do, that review to correct an error occurs “rarely” but is nonetheless within the Court’s jurisdiction.163 Crucially, when the Supreme Court does engage in corrective action,
Bonner Mall still binds its decisions.164 Moreover, it would be odd to conclude
that en banc courts have a stronger entitlement to correcting errors when the
Supreme Court ultimately defines what constitutes error. In fact, an empirical
study has shown that en banc courts are reversed by the Supreme Court more
frequently than panel decisions left untouched by an en banc court, indicating
that en banc self-correction may not result in a truly correct outcome.165
In sum, en banc review operates more like hierarchical review than selfreview. Even if it did not, actual self-review does not warrant exception from
the no-vacatur rule in general, let alone in en banc review in particular, where
there is no particularly heightened need for error correction or majority control as compared to other appellate review.
2.

Jurisdictional Limits on Issuing the Mandate

Other opponents of a no-vacatur rule in the en banc context contend that
an en banc court violates Article III jurisdictional limitations by allowing the
mandate to issue on a moot case. The mandate is a procedural device that acts
like a baton passed between the district and appellate courts to determine
which court has jurisdiction at any given time.166 It is issued by the court’s
clerk along with the opinion in the case as a means of transferring jurisdiction

review, demonstrating that the Court’s ability to police lower courts is fairly constrained. See
Marla Brooke Tusk, Note, No-Citation Rules as a Prior Restraint on Attorney Speech, 103 COLUM.
L. REV. 1202, 1216 (2003).
162. E.g., Hellman, supra note 94, at 442.
163. SUP. CT. R. 10; see also Thomas v. Am. Home Prods., Inc., 519 U.S. 913, 914 (1996)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (contending that Rule 10 does not place limitations on the Court’s authority to hear a case); Hellman, supra note 94, at 430 (explaining that multiple members of the
Court explicitly acknowledged its role in error correction when supporting calls to reform the
Ninth Circuit).
164. See U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 29 (1994) (stating the
rule unqualifiedly).
165. Wasby, supra note 86, at 66. Although this trend likely evinces selection effects in that
cases taken en banc often pose challenging legal questions susceptible to diverging conclusions,
it at least suggests that en banc courts are not always successful error correctors.
166. 16AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER &
CATHERINE T. STRUVE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3987, at 699–703 (5th ed. 2020).
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back to the district court, and it consists of a certified copy of the judgment,
the opinion, and directions regarding costs.167 When a panel renders its decision, that decision is not considered final until the mandate has issued.168 During the pendency of the mandate, the panel or en banc court may revise the
panel opinion or entirely rewrite it.169 Consideration of petitions or sua sponte
calls for en banc review stop the clock for returning the case to the district
court.170 Likewise, issuance of the mandate is suspended for the remainder of
en banc proceedings, as well as for any Supreme Court review.171
Some view issuance of the mandate as a quasi-substantive event that
would run afoul of jurisdictional limitations if undertaken post-mootness. Relying explicitly on this logic, Judge Widener dissented from the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Clipper v. Takoma Park not to vacate a case mooted pending
Rule 35 decision.172 Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit explained that when settlement takes place prior to issuance of the mandate, the panel decision is not
final and thus properly vacated.173 This reasoning also seems to have motivated the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Smith v. Texaco, Inc.174 Because a party
moved to dismiss its appeal pending en banc disposition, the panel concluded
that it had to withdraw its own opinion, as the clerk could not simultaneously
enter an order of dismissal and the panel opinion along with the mandate.175
In contrast, a strong contingent of judges has indicated that the mandate’s
import is more procedural than substantive, belying the concern with jurisdictional restrictions.176 This is the more compelling view. Several features of
the mandate suggest that it represents judicial housekeeping rather than
something akin to a merits decision. First, issuing a mandate is not a discretionary or judgment-based action, but is instead a routine ministerial function
carried out as a matter of course.177 Second, a panel’s decision may be cited as

167. Id.; 4TH CIR. I.O.P. 41.1; 8TH CIR. I.O.P. app. A-9.
168. FED. R. APP. P. 41(c) advisory committee’s note to 1998 amendment.
169. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 166.
170. FED. R. APP. P. 41(b). A party has fourteen days after entry of a panel judgment to
request en banc rehearing, and the mandate issues seven days after expiration of that time. FED.
R. APP. P. 35(c), 40(a), 41(b).
171. FED. R. APP. P. 41(b), (d).
172. 898 F.2d 18, 19 (4th Cir. 1989) (Widener, J., dissenting). He asserted that the court
lacked jurisdiction “to do anything other than withdraw its decision and opinion and vacate the
judgment below” and equated letting the panel decision go into effect with the en banc court
rehearing the moot case on the merits. Clipper, 898 F.2d at 19 (Widener, J., dissenting).
173. Flagship Marine Servs., Inc. v. Belcher Towing Co., 23 F.3d 341, 342 (11th Cir. 1994).
174. See 281 F.3d 477, 478 (5th Cir. 2002).
175. Smith, 281 F.3d at 478.
176. United States v. Flute, 951 F.3d 908 (8th Cir. 2020) (citing Bastien v. Off. of Senator
Ben Nighthorse Campbell, 409 F.3d 1234, 1235 (10th Cir. 2005), and In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d 527, 529 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005)).
177. FED. R. APP. P. 41(b) (stating that the mandate “must issue” after the allotted time
period). The rules in several circuits specify that issuing the mandate is the purview of the clerk,
who does not have authority to make merits decisions. E.g., 4TH CIR. I.O.P. 41.1; 8TH CIR. I.O.P.
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binding authority before the mandate issues.178 The citation may be less forceful because the opinion can be edited or replaced by an en banc or panel rehearing, but the pre-mandate onset of legal authority indicates that the
mandate itself does not bestow legal effect on a panel opinion.
The strongest formulation of the argument that the mandate creates special considerations in the en banc context, like that of the self-review claim, is
that the en banc court has some heightened entitlement to or interest in reviewing its panels’ decisions because they belong to the same judicial body.
Typically, the circuit has a chance to revise its decision prior to issuance of the
mandate.179 Allowing issuance might therefore be characterized as substantive
en banc approval of the panel decision by omission of edits.
If this were an accurate picture of how the mandate operates, the argument would carry more weight. But given the rate at which en banc review
occurs,180 inferring the circuit’s approval from its silence would be a distortion
of reality. It would be practically infeasible for the entire circuit to seriously
consider every panel decision before issuance of the mandate.181 Thus, it
would be inaccurate to portray the mandate as a device of substantive review
rather than a procedural tool. Moreover, issuing the mandate post-mootness
does not give rise to jurisdictional problems since the mandate operates as a
procedural device rather than a merits decision.182
3.

Greater Cause for Concern About Decisional Validity

A final argument against the no-vacatur rule in the en banc context contends that because a decision to rehear a case en banc suggests concerns about
the validity of the panel opinion, mootness pending en banc disposition in particular warrants vacatur. This theory was the subject of cursory commentary
in Wright and Miller’s Federal Practice and Procedure,183 the only secondary

app. A-9; see also Clarke v. United States, 915 F.2d 699, 716 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Edwards, J., dissenting) (“[O]ur issuance of the mandate is wholly separate from our consideration of the merits . . . .”).
178. In re Zermeno-Gomez, 868 F.3d 1048, 1052–53 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[U]ntil the mandate
has issued, a published decision by a panel of this court is subject to modification, withdrawal,
or reversal. . . . [A] published decision constitutes binding authority and must be followed unless
and until it is overruled by a body competent to do so.”).
179. Carver v. Lehman, 558 F.3d 869, 878–79 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Until the mandate has issued, opinions can be, and regularly are, amended . . . .”).
180. See supra note 133 (explaining that en banc courts hear 0.15% of cases decided on appeal).
181. Further, even a vote against en banc rehearing cannot be taken as indication of agreement with the panel. For instance, majoritarians who favor correcting erroneous panel decisions
more frequently recognize that, for efficiency’s sake, not every case can be reexamined. See supra
notes 90–91 and accompanying text.
182. Vacatur may cross the line into merits territory depending on the circumstances of its
use. See infra notes 201–206 and accompanying text.
183. 13C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3533.10.2, at 622–23 (3d ed. 2008). The authors argue the rarity of
en banc review suggests it is undertaken when error may be afoot, justifying deviation from the
no-vacatur default rule. See id.
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work to directly consider the issue of Bonner Mall’s applicability to en banc
review. The theory also underlies multiple decisions.184
There are two primary reasons to think that the panel decision in a case
taken up en banc is likely faulty. First is the high rate at which en banc courts
supersede185 panel decisions. One study found that rate to be approximately
75 percent, a higher reversal rate than the Supreme Court’s, which typically
falls between 60 and 70 percent.186 The higher the reversal rate, the better a
vote to rehear works as a proxy for panel error. Second is the en banc voting
procedure. En banc review requires a majority vote,187 while the Supreme
Court can grant certiorari with only four of nine votes.188 This means a vote
to rehear en banc is more likely than a grant of certiorari to signal that a coalition exists to reverse.
Neither observation justifies departure from Bonner Mall in cases mooted
pending en banc disposition for three reasons. First, both require disregarding
Bonner Mall’s suggestion that vacating post-mootness as a “prophylactic
against legal error” would exceed the judicial power.189 The Court reasoned
that it would be inappropriate to vacate purely based on “assumptions about
the merits” in moot cases, where the court has no constitutional authority to
make merits determinations.190 Specifically, Bonner Mall rejected the assertion
that because the Supreme Court reverses over half of the cases it hears, vacatur
would serve the public interest by preemptively correcting errors.191 The

184. See Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1169–70 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Berzon,
J., concurring) (distinguishing Veneman, which held vacatur was appropriate, on the grounds
that rehearing had already been granted in Veneman); Marc Dev., Inc. v. FDIC, 12 F.3d 948, 949
(10th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (vacating a panel opinion when settlement occurred after rehearing
was granted); Okla. Radio Assocs. v. FDIC, 3 F.3d 1436 (10th Cir. 1993) (denying vacatur of case
settled before a grant of rehearing). None of these decisions cited the Federal Practice and Procedure argument, nor have any cases cited this particular passage in the treatise.
185. “Superseding” better describes the outcome when an en banc court disagrees with a
panel, but here the term is used semi-interchangeably with “reversal” because the rate of Supreme Court reversal and en banc superseding are sometimes discussed together.
186. Compare George, supra note 67, at 246 (explaining that the Supreme Court reverses at a
rate between 60 and 65 percent), and SCOTUS Case Reversal Rates (2007–Present), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/SCOTUS_case_reversal_rates_(2007_-_Present) [perma.cc/F7J7-BCGF]
(determining that, across the 2007–2019 terms, the average rate of reversal was 70.1 percent), with
Hellman, supra note 94, at 456 (finding the rate of superseding in the Ninth Circuit from 1994 to
1999 was approximately 75 percent).
187. FED. R. APP. P. 35(a).
188. No written rule governs this practice, and the origins of the so-called “rule of four”
are obscure. Nevertheless, it remains the official practice of the Supreme Court. See generally
Joan Maisel Leiman, The Rule of Four, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 975 (1957); James F. Fagan, Jr., When
Does Four of a Kind Beat a Full House? The Rise, Fall and Replacement of the Rule of Four, 25
NEW ENG. L. REV. 1101 (1991).
189. U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 27 (1994).
190. Id.
191. Id. The Court reasoned that it would be inappropriate to “dispos[e] of cases, whose
merits are beyond judicial power to consider, on the basis of judicial estimates regarding their
merits.” Id. at 28.
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Court’s logic extended even to cases “more likely to be overturned and hence
presumptively less valid” than cases considered by the Supreme Court.192
Thus, distinguishing en banc review based on its reversal rate and voting procedure would, per Bonner Mall, violate jurisdictional limitations because these
proxies give rise to speculative assumptions about the merits of the panel decision. This is the case despite en banc review’s higher reversal rate.
Second, even if an extremely high reversal rate eradicated Bonner Mall’s
jurisdictional concerns, line-drawing problems would plague any attempt to
determine when the reversal rate is high enough to warrant vacatur. Bonner
Mall admits of no exception to its jurisdictional logic for opinions carrying
more decisive markers of invalidity. However, it could be argued that a reversal rate might be so high that the decision to rehear the case acts as a de facto
merits decision. In such circumstances, vacatur based on that decision would
be warranted. Indeed, if an en banc court had a 100 percent reversal rate, vacatur would look more like judicial housekeeping than a quasi-merits decision. But that is not the reality.193
So the question remains: how high is high enough? Bonner Mall held that
the reversal rate of the Supreme Court, which has varied between approximately
60 and 70 percent each term since 2007,194 did not cut it. What about 75 percent?
Depending on a numerical reversal rate creates a classic and indeterminate
line-drawing problem. The rule would also be unworkable from the perspective of consistency since reversal rates vary across years, circuits, the procedural posture of the case, whether a plaintiff or defendant is appealing, and so
on.195 Under a reversal-rate test, it would be impossible to identify the magic
number, let alone the appropriate way to divide the universe of decisions into
units for consideration. The Court’s rejection of such an approach in Bonner
Mall acknowledges that the line is hard to draw and even harder to administer.
Lastly, although en banc voting procedure may also suggest that the vote
approximates a pre-mootness merits determination, the existence of alternative reasons to vote for rehearing undermines that conclusion. The argument
would go that, regardless of the reversal rate, en banc voting procedure means
that a vote to rehear is tantamount to a merits decision. Instead of identifying
a magic reversal rate, this approach would assess whether the vote to rehear
en banc is a good proxy for reversal based on the kind of decisionmaking happening at the voting stage. If it were true that judges decide to rehear en banc
solely based on their views of the merits of a panel decision, the fact that en
banc procedure requires a majority vote would indeed create a stronger case
for vacatur than does a grant of certiorari. But this is not the case.

192. Id.
193. See supra note 186.
194. See SCOTUS Case Reversal Rates (2007–Present), supra note 186.
195. See supra note 186 and accompanying text (showing the Supreme Court’s reversal
rates varying from year to year and circuit to circuit); Lynne Liberato & Kent Rutter, Reasons for
Reversal in the Texas Courts of Appeals, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 993, 997–99 (2012) (finding empirical
evidence of this kind of variance in Texas courts).
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No matter how it is done, peering behind a vote to rehear in an effort to
find substantive meaning fails because a vote to rehear en banc is not always a
vote to correct a bad decision.196 To be sure, dissents from denials of en banc
rehearing often argue rehearing was appropriate because the panel’s opinion
was incorrect, indicating that votes do sometimes approximate merits decisions.197 However, other possible meanings proliferate. Rule 35 dictates that a
vote to rehear can be driven by an interest in promoting consistency within
the circuit’s law, meaning that a case may be taken up to confirm it is correct
despite conflicting with other circuit law.198 A vote might also indicate a desire
to split from another circuit only in a full-court decision, even if the panel is
correct.199 Further, it would be difficult to discern when a decision to rehear is
based on a belief about panel error because en banc courts need not provide
reasons for rehearing, and concurring judges who provide reasoning do not
speak for the full circuit’s motivations.200
Even when error correction is the driving force behind a vote to rehear a
case, initial views do not always predict an ultimate outcome, making the vote
a poor proxy for invalidity. En banc review allows for further briefing and argument that may change a judge’s mind.201 A closer look may also change a
judge’s mind, as Justice Breyer and other judges have explained about their
own processes of reaching a determination.202 Thus, a vote to rehear should
be considered a decision to look further into the case’s merits rather than a
quasi-merits decision.

196. And because a vote against rehearing does not necessarily indicate faith in the panel
decision’s merits, using a vote to rehear as a proxy for panel validity may get it wrong in both
directions. For a discussion of why a no vote does not equate to actual approval, see Solimine,
supra note 85, at 57.
197. See, e.g., Oliver v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 911 F.3d 1381, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2019)
(en banc) (Newman, J., dissenting) (arguing that the panel decision was “legally and scientifically
incorrect”); Tanvir v. Tanzin, 915 F.3d 898, 901 (2d Cir. 2019) (en banc) (Jacobs, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he panel’s reasoning fails as a matter of law and logic and runs counter to clear Supreme
Court guidance . . . .”).
198. This probably represents a small proportion of the relevant cases since there is a strong
norm preventing panels from overruling other panels. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
199. Rule 35 would support such a reason for en banc rehearing, as the advisory committee
notes indicate that intercircuit consistency is one factor in favor of making a case one of “exceptional importance.” See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
200. Solimine, supra note 85, at 69 (lamenting that lack of explicit reasoning justifying en
banc rehearing makes it difficult to analyze trends in this area).
201. E.g., 11TH CIR. R. 35-7, 35-8 (requiring a new briefing schedule and providing for
amicus briefing in cases reheard en banc).
202. Hellman, supra note 94, at 462 (citing a speech in which Justice Breyer stated that
thinking a case through for final determination often yields an understanding “very different”
than the one he began with); see also Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1324 (11th Cir.
2011) (en banc) (Dubina, C.J., concurring specially) (“Even though I initially agreed with the
panel opinion, I now concur fully in the well-reasoned majority opinion and write separately to
emphasize that after studying the issue further and having the benefit of en banc oral argument
and briefing, I am persuaded . . . .”).
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This Note does not argue that there could never be a case where vacatur
pending en banc review is justified due to “extraordinary circumstances,” nor
does it argue that concerns about decisional validity in a specific case could
not constitute such circumstances.203 This Note only maintains that an order
to rehear en banc does not, on its own, reach the level of an extraordinary
circumstance. One might contend, for instance, that a panel decision admitting to introducing a novel legal rule, as in Gary B., or in a more extreme example, one admitting to conflicting with valid Supreme Court precedent,
would justify an exception to the no-vacatur rule when combined with an order to rehear en banc. It is worth noting that rulings invoking the extraordinary-circumstance exception to vacate a district-court opinion typically do
not focus on decisional validity but rather on the need to stimulate settlement
where vacatur is extremely important to one party.204 Nevertheless, concerns
about decisional validity are far from frivolous and may warrant exceptions in
particular cases or kinds of cases. This Note leaves identifying the principles
to guide case-by-case analysis in this area for another day.
In sum, distinctions based on self-review, issuance of the mandate, and
greater likelihood of erroneous decisions fall short of distinguishing vacatur
pending en banc review from vacatur pending appeal generally. As such, en
banc vacatur should not be exempted as a class from the Bonner Mall no-vacatur rule.
III. STAKES AND SOLUTIONS
The foregoing discussion illuminates that the current state of vacatur doctrine in the en banc setting is out of step with the prevailing framework. This
poses problems for judicial legitimacy and other judicial policy aims that Bonner Mall sought to promote, like protecting precedent. This Part explains these
problems and offers a solution: a revision to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure that brings en banc vacatur in line with vacatur doctrine as a whole.
A. Unexplained Departures from Bonner Mall’s Policy Priorities
Despite the foregoing demonstration of Bonner Mall’s neat application to
en banc decisions, courts have on the whole displayed little awareness of or
interest in the topic and have taken inconsistent approaches to it, a tendency
entrenched by local automatic-vacatur rules.205 The implications of this judicial inconsistency and silence come in two buckets. First is the harm to judicial
legitimacy, resulting from sparse reasoning and the apparent influence of political preferences on vacatur outcomes. Second is that the policies to which
Bonner Mall sought to give effect are undermined by courts’ failure to fully
apply the doctrine.

203.
204.
205.

See supra note 52.
See supra note 52.
See supra notes 115–122 and accompanying text.
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Reasoned Decisionmaking and Judicial Legitimacy

The current judicial approach to en banc vacatur is riddled with inconsistency, confusion, and omitted reasoning—trends exacerbated by automatic-vacatur rules. In turn, the distinct lack of reasoning given in en banc
vacatur decisions harms judicial legitimacy and credibility on the topic. This
is particularly true when unexplained decisions appear politically motivated.
Reasoned decisionmaking is an important function of judicial work. Scholarship on the importance of this practice has identified several of its “virtues,”
including improved decisional quality, efficiency, consistency, accountability,
constrained decisionmakers, and strengthened legitimacy.206 Recently, the Supreme Court’s “shadow docket”—its diet of cases decided summarily and
without oral argument—has become a subject of public consternation in part
because the Court does not explain most of its summary decisions.207 How
courts decide when a case ought to be taken en banc has also drawn criticism
for lack of reasoning.208 One proposal for disciplining the use of the en banc
procedure regardless of mootness would have judges explain why a case is one
of “exceptional importance” in an effort to give shape to the considerations
referred to in that vague inquiry.209
Similarly, current vacatur doctrine violates the best practice of reasoned
decisionmaking, which raises legitimacy concerns.210 Recall Chief Justice Roberts’s umpire analogy.211 Judicial reasoning, like calling balls and strikes, facilitates trust in the adjudicative process because it explains differing outcomes.
Without those calls, the contours of the inconsistency between cases like Gary

206. E.g., Ashley S. Deeks, Secret Reason-Giving, 129 YALE L.J. 612, 627–34 (2020); Merritt
E. McAlister, “Downright Indifference”: Examining Unpublished Decisions in the Federal Courts
of Appeals, 118 MICH. L. REV. 533, 583 (2020) (“[R]eason-giving shows litigants respect, allows
for meaningful participation, and demonstrates the decisionmaker’s independence and trustworthiness.”).
207. See Mark Walsh, The Supreme Court’s ‘Shadow Docket’ Is Drawing Increasing Scrutiny, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 20, 2020, 8:20 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/web/article/scotusshadow-docket-draws-increasing-scrutiny [perma.cc/FU3X-RCB7]; Steve Vladek, The Supreme
Court’s Most Partisan Decisions Are Flying Under the Radar, SLATE (Aug. 11, 2020, 12:12 PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/08/supreme-court-shadow-docket.html [perma.cc
/8EXQ-Y6CW] (expressing concern with the uptick in unreasoned, highly divided cases decided
during the Trump administration).
208. Solimine, supra note 85, at 60–61.
209. Id.
210. It may be true that a technical issue of this nature does not typically draw public concern. But when high profile cases like Gary B. and Washington v. Trump are at issue, as they
often are when en banc review is involved, there is a heightened need to adhere to the letter of
jurisdictional and procedural rules and provide reasons for deviating from possibly applicable
precedents like Bonner Mall. See Fialka-Feldman v. Oakland Univ. Bd. of Trs., 639 F.3d 711, 715
(6th Cir. 2011) (“Matters of great public interest are precisely the kinds of issues that demand
the federal courts to be most vigilant in this area—vigilant that the powers they exercise are
powers the Constitution gives them . . . .”).
211. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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B., Veneman, and Washington v. Trump are obscured, producing skepticism
about judicial process and motives.
These legitimacy concerns are heightened when the unexplained decisions defy judicial common sense or otherwise hint at improper judicial motivation. In the context of the shadow docket, commentators have noted the
Court’s apparently politically motivated double standards in using the docket
to reverse certain errors but not others,212 and its occasional disregard for jurisdictional constraints like mootness.213 Both varieties of concerning outcomes exist in cases involving en banc vacatur. For one, judges’ political
leanings, as gauged by the party of their appointing President,214 appear closely
linked to the outcomes in cases like Gary B. and Washington v. Trump. In
those two cases, the judges’ positions on vacatur correlated with their views
on the merits of highly contentious panel decisions with political ramifications.215 This observation tracks with recent research noting a surge in political
use of the en banc mechanism as a whole.216

212. See, e.g., Will Baude, The Supreme Court’s Double Standard for Qualified Immunity
Cases, REASON: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 24, 2017, 2:06 PM), https://reason.com/volokh/2017/04/24/the-supreme-courts-double-stan [perma.cc/PUF7-KE4G] (observing asymmetry in the Court’s willingness to grant summary reversal of erroneous grants of qualified
immunity in comparison to erroneous denials of the same). As political tides have turned against
qualified immunity, the court’s asymmetric summary reversals have seemingly responded in
kind. See Joanna Schwartz, The Supreme Court Is Giving Lower Courts a Subtle Hint to Rein in
Police Misconduct, ATLANTIC (Mar. 4, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive
/2021/03/the-supreme-courts-message-on-police-misconduct-is-changing/618193
[perma.cc/L93J-WE4H] (describing two recent qualified-immunity cases on the shadow docket
that bucked the prior trend).
213. Dahlia Lithwick, Amy Coney Barrett Is Already Putting Her Mark on the Supreme
Court, SLATE (Dec. 22, 2020, 11:52 AM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/12/religiousliberty-supreme-court-amy-coney-barrett-coronavirus-shadow-docket.html [perma.cc/EZP9Q4FR] (noting with concern that many of the highly political cases regarding COVID-19 restrictions decided in favor of religious liberty on the Court’s shadow docket were likely moot).
214. This is a common proxy indicator used by those doing empirical work on en banc
review. E.g., Neal Devins & Allison Orr Larsen, Weaponizing En Banc, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 5 n.12), https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3782576.
215. The five judges who dissented in Washington v. Trump (Judges Kozinski, Bybee, Callahan, Bea, and Ikuta), calling for vacatur of a decision unfavorable to a Republican administration, were all Republican-appointed, while the two who penned concurrences (Judges Reinhardt
and Berzon) were appointed by Democrats. In Gary B., Michigan’s Republican-led legislature
moved to intervene to fight against the plaintiffs’ educational equality claims. See Donahue, supra note 8. The Sixth Circuit took the case en banc, which triggered automatic vacatur of the
plaintiffs’ previous win. Although the vote tally on rehearing en banc was not reported, a majority of the judges on the Sixth Circuit are Republican-appointed. The picture is less clear in Veneman, where vacatur of a panel decision favorable to animal rights was at issue. While those in
dissent from vacatur (Judges Thomas, Hawkins, McKeown, Wardlaw, Gould, and Fisher) were
all Democrat-appointed, and those who wrote or joined the concurrence (Judges Bybee and Callahan) were both Republican-appointed, the en banc court was majority Democrat-appointed,
so the pro-vacatur outcome demonstrates some straying from political lines, albeit in a less controversial case.
216. See Devins & Larsen, supra note 214 (manuscript at 8) (reporting empirical finding
that a statistically significant spike in “partisan” en banc usage took place in 2018–2020).
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Additionally, the current regime at times leads en banc courts to treat the
district-court and panel opinions in a case inconsistently. In Tafas, for instance, the en banc court refused to vacate the district-court opinion, citing
Bonner Mall, but allowed the panel’s opinion in the case to remain vacated.217
The panel partially reversed the district-court opinion,218 yet the circuit allowed the district-court opinion to stand in spite of concerns about its validity219 while disallowing the panel’s opinion from having effect.220 The same
thing occurred in Gary B.: the district court declined to recognize a fundamental right in the education realm, and that opinion stood following vacatur
of the panel opinion.221 That result created an appearance of political motivation on the part of the en banc court because it aligned with the preferences of
the Michigan legislature’s conservatives.222 These outcomes, largely unsupported by judicial reasoning, inspire confidence neither in the accuracy of
these courts’ decisions nor in their impartiality.
2.

Upholding Bonner Mall’s Protections for Precedent

Another problematic result of inconsistent application of Bonner Mall in
the en banc setting is failure to uphold the policy ends prioritized by Bonner
Mall: preserving precedent and preventing its manipulation by litigants. Because Bonner Mall has not been uniformly applied to cases mooted pending
en banc review, precedential decisions can be eliminated if the parties choose
to settle while en banc review is still possible.223 This subverts the goal of Bonner Mall by creating a clear path for litigants to eradicate precedent.
Further, Bonner Mall stated that no exception to the no-vacatur rule exists
when the parties agree to vacatur in the settlement, a practice sometimes called
“consensual vacatur.”224 In the debate over the benefits of consensual vacatur
as an incentive to settle, Bonner Mall took a stance against private parties using
settlement to manipulate precedential law.225 Thus, failing to enforce the Bonner
217. Tafas v. Kappos, 586 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc).
218. Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1364 (Fed. Cir.), vacated en banc, 328 F. App’x 658 (Fed.
Cir. 2009).
219. Id. at 1359.
220. In Staley v. Harris County, a procedurally similar case, the court explicitly cited the
fact that the panel had affirmed the district court in its decision not to vacate the district-court
opinion, showing awareness of the incongruity of vacating a panel decision while refusing to
vacate the district-court opinion. 485 F.3d 305, 313 (5th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
221. Gary B. v. Snyder, 329 F. Supp. 3d 344, 366 (E.D. Mich. 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part sub nom. Gary B. v. Whitmer, 957 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. 2020), vacated en banc, 958 F.3d 1216
(6th Cir. 2020) (dismissing the case without reinstating the panel opinion or vacating the district-court opinion).
222. See supra note 215.
223. See supra Section I.D (describing the different procedural scenarios).
224. U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 26, 29 (1994) (making
clear that precedent is not the “property” of the litigants).
225. On one side of this debate are those who assert that consensual vacatur allows rich,
repeat litigants to systematically “buy” vacatur of adverse opinions, thus distorting the shape of
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Mall rule in cases mooted pending en banc review undermines the Court’s effort to prevent parties from using vacatur to shape precedent in their favor.
Even those who would object to Bonner Mall’s position on consensual vacatur because it may discourage settlement should not be in favor of the current approach. Unresolved doctrine itself inhibits settlement because
uncertainty about outcomes often results in the parties valuing the claim differently, making it less likely they will reach a mutually satisfactory agreement.226 The paucity of guidance regarding en banc vacatur prevents the
parties from calculating risks associated with various settlement strategies.
Consider the settlement situation in Gary B. Assuming the defendants
preferred vacatur of the panel opinion and the plaintiffs did not, the plaintiffs
might have been convinced to compromise on certain demands in exchange
for a speedy resolution which would avoid the automatic-vacatur order accompanying the circuit’s decision to take the case up en banc. But the law is
unclear on whether that automatic-vacatur order must be reversed when settlement-related mootness subsequently arises. Given the uncertainty, the parties may take divergent views of the law, thus valuing a swift settlement
differently and creating a barrier to mutual agreement.
Additionally, if courts resolved the current inconsistency by agreeing that
Bonner Mall does not apply to en banc review, that doctrinal anomaly would
still exacerbate the problem of parties manipulating precedent. Parties seeking
to effect a consensual vacatur would know to settle after panel disposition but
before en banc disposition, as the contexts in which Bonner Mall applies do
not allow for such agreements. And sophisticated litigants might catch their
adversaries unaware by settling after petitioning for en banc review, securing
vacatur without mutual consent to that outcome. Worse, a party could obtain
vacatur without settling by carrying out the court’s order. For instance, a party
could pay what they owe based on the judgment or drop criminal charges,
thereby mooting the case before the mandate issues.227 Consequently, litigants

the law in their favor. On the other are those who argue that consensual vacatur promotes settlement—a desirable and efficient outcome—by acting as a valuable bargaining chip. For overviews and various perspectives, see Tulumello, supra note 37, at 217–22; Fisch, supra note 17, at
332–60; Resnik, supra note 139; Eugene R. Anderson, Mark Garbowski & Daniel J. Healy, Out
of the Frying Pan and into the Fire: The Emergence of Depublication in the Wake of Vacatur, 4 J.
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 475 (2002). The efficiency of the practice is also contested, as consensual
vacatur would seem to disincentivize settling before trial because the parties might view adverse
precedent as avoidable via settlement later on. Fisch, supra note 17, at 337.
226. Scott A. Moss, Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis of Confidential Settlements, 105 MICH. L. REV. 867, 875–77 (2007).
227. This concern was the basis of a Ninth Circuit panel’s reluctance to vacate its own decision when mootness arose prior to issuance of the mandate. See United States v. Payton, 593
F.3d 881, 883 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153, 163–64
(2016) (citing cases where defendants successfully mooted claims unilaterally by paying the unpaid taxes at issue in the case).
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would be incentivized to file petitions for en banc review more frequently, a
result contrary to efficiency aims.228
Judicial inconsistency and silence regarding Bonner Mall’s role in en banc
review creates efficiency problems, opportunities for parties to manipulate
precedent, and situations in which court actions appear politically motivated
or otherwise suspect. Ultimately, this harms judicial legitimacy. Considered
in combination with the argument laid out in Part II that en banc review does
not meaningfully differ from other appellate contexts, these conclusions
counsel in favor of adopting a clear rule—specifically, the Bonner Mall rule.
B. Revisions to Rule 35 and Other Alternatives
The solution to this little-discussed doctrinal problem appears relatively
simple: courts should recognize the limitations of Bonner Mall when vacating
a panel decision pending en banc review. This Section proposes a revision to
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35 that would facilitate this change. This
revision is preferable to an alternative reform—recognizing vacated opinions
as precedential—because that proposal would dilute the force of vacatur
where it is deployed as a useful and legitimate equitable remedy.
This Note proposes adding a subsection to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35229 that would read as follows:
Where settlement or unilateral action of the losing party moots a case before
issuance of the mandate, whether an en banc petition has not been filed, is
pending, was rejected, or en banc rehearing has already been ordered but not
completed, the court shall not vacate the panel’s decision unless extraordinary circumstances demand it. If the court previously vacated the panel’s decision in anticipation of en banc rehearing, the court shall reinstate it unless
extraordinary circumstances demand otherwise.

This proposal mirrors the rule set out in Bonner Mall instead of simply
referencing it, because the case only directly addresses settlement and not
other types of unilateral mootness.230 The rule is written to cover all manner
of procedural scenarios pending en banc review, reflecting Section II.B’s contention that the arguments distinguishing certain procedural postures are not
persuasive. It is specific and directive rather than simply requiring judicial
reasoning on en banc vacatur because such an approach would likely result in
slower and less complete reform.231

228. Circuits are already inundated with en banc petitions, to the displeasure of circuit
judges. See Arnold, supra note 76, at 29.
229. As previously noted, the Appellate Rules Committee is currently considering abrogating
Rule 35 and moving its contents to Rule 40. ADVISORY COMM. ON APP. RULES, supra note 147, at
125–31. This change may serve as an opportunity to adjust Rule 35 according to my proposal.
230. See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.
231. One reason for this is that certain factual scenarios implicating the doctrine rarely
arise. Vacatur of cases mooted pending en banc disposition is particularly uncommon given the
rarity of en banc review itself. See supra note 133.
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The proposed language does not require circuits to abandon automatic
vacatur. The practice of automatic vacatur is of questionable validity because
it is unclear what injustice it remedies.232 But it does not on its own cause
problems related to reasoned decisionmaking or judicial legitimacy because
courts can reinstate vacated panel decisions.233 As such, only post-mootness
automatic vacatur, as in Gary B., would be barred by the new rule. However,
automatic vacatur before mootness arises would be treated as temporary, as
the rule instructs courts to reinstate vacated precedent once mootness comes
about. This approach comports with the assumption underlying automatic
vacatur, namely that the panel decision will be replaced with an en banc one.234
When that assumption no longer holds, the vacatur should be reversed in
keeping with the interest in preserving precedent.
The Rule 35 revision this Note proposes is preferable to another possible
reform—elevating the precedential value of vacated opinions—that holds
some appeal but is ultimately flawed. According to black letter law, vacated
decisions have absolutely no precedential value.235 Yet vacated cases are regularly cited for their persuasive value, just as district-court opinions or scholarly
articles are.236 In fact, empirical work has suggested that citation to vacated
cases has increased in recent years.237 Some contend that, in light of this development, one way to satisfy Bonner Mall’s insistence on preserving precedent is to reconsider or redefine what is precedential and legitimize citations
to cases vacated pending en banc review. The authors of Federal Practice and
Procedure have endorsed this approach as a promising workaround by noting
the distinction between vacating a judgment and an opinion.238

232. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
233. One could argue that automatic vacatur prevents citation to likely erroneous decisions in the interim between panel and en banc determinations. But because similar concerns
about premature citation govern when certiorari is granted but the Court has not yet ruled, and
are likely offset by professional norms regarding notation of case status in any case, it is difficult
to see why this would merit such a drastic response in the en banc context. See Sullivan, supra
note 57, at 1187–96 (investigating prevalence of citation to vacated decisions by searching for
the term “vacated on other grounds” on Lexis).
234. See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Veneman, 490 F.3d 725, 734 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining the assumption that an automatically vacated panel decision
will be replaced).
235. See County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 634 n.6 (1979) (“Of necessity our
decision ‘vacating the judgment of the Court of Appeals deprives that court’s opinion of precedential effect . . . .’ ” (quoting O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 578 n.12 (1975) (Burger,
C.J., concurring))); Fisch, supra note 17, at 330.
236. Michael D. Moberly, This Is Unprecedented: Examining the Impact of Vacated State
Appellate Court Opinions, 13 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 231, 233 & n.17, 243 n.72, 251 n.138, 253–
57 (2012).
237. See Sullivan, supra note 57, at 1188–90.
238. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 183 (“To the extent that courts are worried about preserving the precedential value of an opinion, they need only decide that the precedential weight of
an opinion rendered on deciding a still-living case is not undercut by subsequent vacation of the
judgment upon settlement.”).
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To be sure, elevating the precedential status of vacated opinions would
promote certain efficiencies. Encouraging citation to such cases would make
use of the courts’ work in writing the vacated opinions and would add to the
body of judicial reasoning future courts may call on in resolving legal questions.239 Similar claims are made about citation to district-court opinions,
which is said to stimulate fulsome judicial discussion and promote consistency and legitimacy.240
Despite these advantages, the reform would be problematic because it
would make vacatur a less effective equitable remedy in some contexts. Vacatur addresses a valid fairness issue by eradicating the precedential effects of a
case when a party had no control over the mootness that prevented further
appeal.241 Allowing unfettered citation to vacated opinions would undercut
the Munsingwear doctrine by rendering vacatur meaningless. Although carving out Bonner Mall cases for this treatment might counteract that outcome,
it would be nearly impossible to decipher why a given opinion was vacated
because courts currently do not explain the basis for vacatur.242 Thus, no
workable method of elevating only certain vacated opinions is available.
Additionally, any efficiencies from adopting the precedential-status approach would be outweighed by the inefficiencies it would likely produce. The
potential difficulties are illustrated by the uncertain precedential value of unpublished opinions. Because nonbinding appellate opinions may diverge from
binding case law, citing those nonbinding opinions as persuasive precedent
can create doctrinal inconsistency.243 Such divergences create litigant uncertainty about the legal merits of a case, which tends to result in fewer settlements.244 So too, citation to vacated opinions may cause may cause
inconsistency to proliferate in circuit law, increasing confusion and discouraging settlement. Additionally, the profession is already prone to misusing
nonbinding precedent by analogizing badly and overstating the weight of the

239. While one might counter that simply allowing citation to vacated opinions as persuasive precedent does not restore the binding precedential status of the opinion, binding and persuasive precedent are not entirely distinct categories but points on a spectrum of judicial
deference to preceding legal reasoning. Fisch, supra note 17, at 346–47. On this account, because
binding precedent may nevertheless be distinguished or narrowed to its facts, the true value of
precedent is in its persuasive content. Promoting citation to vacated cases would restore their
ability to persuade, just as binding cases do.
240. Gardner, supra note 58, at 1624 (“There are good reasons for such citations [to nonbinding precedents], including judicial economy, epistemic development, consistency, legitimacy, and the development of peer relationships.”).
241. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text.
242. See Lewis, supra note 38, at 887.
243. Ricks, supra note 58, at 222 (“While issuing nonprecedential opinions is often defended on efficiency grounds, doctrinal inconsistency between a circuit’s precedential and nonprecedential opinions undercuts that rationale because doctrinal divergences may lead plaintiffs
and defendants to value cases differently—potentially leading to more litigation, fewer settlements, and additional adjudication.”).
244. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
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authority.245 By allowing citation to vacated opinions with murky authoritative status, the precedential-status reform would compound that tendency and
further muddle the law.
In sum, this Note’s proposal is the most promising reform because it gives
courts an explicit rule to follow. Instead of creating a workaround that would
produce only confusion, this reform would immediately clarify the applicability of Bonner Mall and impose its limitations on en banc vacatur.
CONCLUSION
The remedial effects of vacatur are reserved for situations involving private injustice or harm to the public, a set of cases that does not typically include those mooted due to settlement pending appeal or en banc review.
Mixed judicial stances on en banc vacatur are unjustified by the existent distinguishing arguments and artificially perpetuated by local automatic-vacatur
rules. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure can be amended to give clear
guidance against vacating cases that are mooted by settlement while en banc
review is pending. Such a reform would preserve the precedential status of
important panel opinions and promote associated policy aims. It would also
bolster judicial legitimacy by removing the appearance of unreasoned and politically motivated decisionmaking. In highly political cases like Gary B. and
Washington v. Trump, courts must have clear doctrinal guidelines to keep judicial work tied to the relevant legal considerations rather than unrelated political commitments. Revising Rule 35 to affirm that en banc vacatur is more
than mere judicial housekeeping would represent a step in that direction.

245.

See Gardner, supra note 58, at 1624–25.

